Can Television Ads Persuade? Strategy and Choice of Television Advertising in U.S. House of Representatives Elections by Searle, David Mordecai
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Can Television Ads Persuade? Strategy and Choice of Television Advertising in U.S. House of 
Representatives Elections
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2g6048g1
Author
Searle, David Mordecai
Publication Date
2017
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Can Television Ads Persuade? Strategy and Choice of Television Advertising in U.S.
House of Representatives Elections
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science
by
David Mordecai Searle
Committee in charge:
Professor Marisa Abrajano, Chair
Professor Zoltan Hajnal
Professor Seth Hill
Professor Gary Jacobson
Professor John Skrentny
2017
Copyright
David Mordecai Searle, 2017
All rights reserved.
The dissertation of David Mordecai Searle is approved, and it
is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm
and electronically:
Chair
University of California, San Diego
2017
iii
DEDICATION
To Naomi
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Signature Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abstract of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 Advertising and Electoral Success in Low Information Elections . . . 7
Chapter 3 The (Un)Persuasive Effects of Negative Advertising: An Experimental
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 4 Interest Group or Candidate: Sponsor Irrelevance in the Persuasiveness
of Television Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Chapter 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Appendix A Chapter 2 Appendix: Aggregate Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendix B Chapter 3 Appendix: Experimental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Appendix C Chapter 4 Appendix: Interest Group Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . 124
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Competitive Elections . . . . . . 25
Figure 3.1: Main Dependent Variable: Vote Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 3.2: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: MTurk Sample 1 . . . . . . 43
Figure 3.3: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: CCES Sample . . . . . . . 44
Figure 3.4: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: MTurk Sample 2 . . . . . . 45
Figure 3.5: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it.
46
Figure 3.6: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it.
47
Figure 3.7: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it.
48
Figure 4.1: Main Dependent Variable: Vote Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 4.2: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it.
68
Figure 4.3: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor, 3 Types . . . 70
Figure 4.4: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor, 6 Types . . . 71
Figure 4.5: Persuasiveness by 3 Types of Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 4.6: Persuasiveness by 6 Types of Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Figure A.1: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in All Elections . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure A.2: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Uncompetitive Elections . . . . 109
Figure A.3: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in All Elections by Partisanship . . 110
Figure A.4: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Competitive Elections by Parti-
sanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
vi
Figure A.5: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it.
112
Figure C.1: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor: Binary
Choice, 6 Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections 19
Table 2.2: Binary OLS Regression by Advertising in Competitive Elections . . . . 21
Table 2.3: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone in Competitive
Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 2.4: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 2.5: Aggregate Number of Ads in Competitive Elections . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 3.1: Experimental Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 3.2: Example Matrix for Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 3.3: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . 50
Table 3.4: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 3.5: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 3.6: Emotional Responses by Advertising Tone to Democratic Ads . . . . . . 53
Table 3.7: Emotional Responses by Advertising Tone to Republican Ads . . . . . . 54
Table 4.1: Sample Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Table 4.2: Experimental Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Table 4.3: Example Matrix for Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Table 4.4: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Sponsor . . . . . . . . 75
Table 4.5: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Table 4.6: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Table A1: Table of Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table A2: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections 87
Table A3: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections 88
Table A4: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone in Competitive
Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
viii
Table A5: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Table A6: Table of Means, All Single Media-Market Districts . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Table A7: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Table A8: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share by Weeks Aggregated 93
Table A9: Binary OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone for All
Ad Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table A10: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone, All Ad Data . . 95
Table A11: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Table A12: OLS Regression of Natural Log of Number of Ads, Competitive Districts 98
Table A13: OLS Regression of Ad Tone, with Squared Ad Totals, Competitive
Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Table A14: OLS Regression of Proportion of Ads, Competitive Elections . . . . . . 100
Table A15: Logit Regression of Democratic Winner by Ad Tone in Competitive
Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Table A16: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Table A17: OLS Regression by Ad Tone, Weighted by Cost, Competitive Elections . 104
Table A18: OLS Regression by Logged Ad Tone, Weighted by Cost, Competitive
Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Table A19: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Table A20: Aggregate Proportion of Ads in Competitive Elections . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table A21: Aggregate Number of Ads in Competitive Elections by Partisanship . . 108
Table A22: Aggregate Proportion of Ads in Competitive Elections by Partisanship . 109
Table B1: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Table B2: Balance Table of Covariates, MTurk Sample 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table B3: Balance Table of Covariates, CCES Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table B4: Balance Table of Covariates, MTurk Sample 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table B5: Table of Covariate Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table B6: Advertisements in the Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Table B7: Characteristics of 2008 Michigan House Advertisements . . . . . . . . 116
Table B8: Characteristics of 2012 Virginia House Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 117
Table B9: Democratic Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising Tone . . . . 118
ix
Table B10: Republican Candidate Thermometer by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . 118
Table B11: T-tests for Change in Support by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Table B12: T-tests for Change in Support by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Table B13: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Table B14: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Table B15: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Table B16: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Table B17: Correlations Between Vote Choice and Thermometer Ratings . . . . . . 121
Table B18: Treatment Group Size by Partisanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Table B19: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups and Partisanship . . . . . . 122
Table B20: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone, Democrats Only 122
Table B21: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone, Republicans Only122
Table B22: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Table B23: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Table B24: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Table B25: LaTeX Error: There’s no line here to endSee the LaTeX manual or
LaTeX Companion for explanation.Your command was ignored.Type I
¡command¿ ¡return¿ to replace it with another command,or ¡return¿ to
continue without it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Table C1: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Table C2: Balance Table of Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Table C3: Advertisements in the Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Table C4: Characteristics of 2010 Ohio House Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . 127
x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to my entire committee for helping and guiding me through this long pro-
cess, as they have been instrumental in my success. Seth has provided valuable insight,
especially in the research design phase. He provided critical feedback in designing my
survey experiments as well as joining with Gary to provide me the opportunity to place my
experiment on the 2014 CCES. Gary was also incredibly helpful with any and all questions
regarding congressional elections. He also provided careful readings of drafts of my papers
and providing both substantive and grammatical feedback. Zoli has read many drafts and
provided beneficial comments and suggestions on the writing as well as suggestions for
alternative analyses. He has provided crucial suggestions in how best to present my results
and prepare my papers and research for publication.
I especially want to thank Marisa for all her help over the last six years, guiding
me from entering graduate school all the way through the finish line with the dissertation.
Marisa has worked closely with me and was instrumental in my success. She has directed
my research and guided me with my dissertation topic and how best to contribute to the state
of the literature. She has also read more drafts than I care to admit and always providing
important feedback on my work.
I have also received valuable feedback from countless graduate students and faculty
within the Department of Political Science at UC, San Diego. This has included during
several presentations at the department workshop and American politics workshop. This
research would not have been completed without the Sanford Lakoff Fellowship that funded
three MTurk experiments, Gary Jacobson and Seth Hill who allowed me to place on questions
on the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in 2014, and various individuals through
Experiments.com who helped fund my final MTurk experiment.
Thanks also to my constant office made Newton, who has provided endless support.
Finally, Naomi for her never-wavering support and belief in my ability to complete this
xi
dissertation.
xii
VITA
2010 B. S. in Mathematics, University of Maryland, College Park
2010 B. A. in Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College
Park
2015 M. A. in Political Science, University of California, San Diego
2011-2017 Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of California, San Diego
2017 Ph. D. in Political Science, University of California, San Diego
xiii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Can Television Ads Persuade? Strategy and Choice of Television Advertising in U.S.
House of Representatives Elections
by
David Mordecai Searle
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, San Diego, 2017
Professor Marisa Abrajano, Chair
Congressional candidates spend the majority of their campaign funds on television
advertising to reach the highest number of voters, spending almost $300 million in 2014
alone. Yet previous research has not fully answered if advertising is associated with increased
electoral success. In particular, this represents the first analysis of television advertising
in elections for the United States House of Representatives. It also represents the first
analysis of competitive, low information elections where voters have limited knowledge of
the candidates. First, I examine U.S. House races over six electoral cycles from 2000-2012
to test how positive, negative, or contrast ads correlate with electoral success. Then, I
xiv
build upon this analysis with a novel experiment that more closely models the information
environment in competitive, low information campaigns by exposing respondents to one
advertisement from each candidate using past television advertisements. This provides
causal evidence linking the tone of an advertisement with changes in electoral support.
Finally, since the 2010 Citizens United ruling interest groups are spending increasingly
large amounts of money in U.S. congressional elections. Instead of advertising tone, I test
whether the advertising sponsor influences how voters perceive and evaluate the candidates,
comparing traditional candidate-sponsored ads with interest group-sponsored ads. The
results highlight how tone and sponsor yields little effect on electoral support. The effect
that does exist is not the intended effect of an ad, but rather the backlash against the candidate
sponsoring a negative ad. However, candidates can avoid this issue by having interest groups
air their negative ads on their behalf. I find that interest group ads are equally persuasive
compared to candidate-sponsored ads and yield a smaller backlash penalty against the
preferred candidate. Taken together, these findings have important consequences for the role
of advertising in U.S. elections and the power interest groups are increasingly wielding to
influence electoral outcomes.
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Television advertising represents the single largest expenditure for political candi-
dates running for the U.S. House of Representatives. Every election candidates spend an
increasingly large amount of money airing advertisements; today that results in candidates
in competitive districts spending millions of dollars each. Collectively, in 2016 U.S. House
candidates spent approximately $335 million airing over 600,000 ads (Fowler, Ridout and
Franz 2016). Television advertising has become so commonplace that no competitive can-
didate would consider not airing ads during a campaign. Every electoral cycle there are
several competitive House elections that may determine control of Congress, and advertising
may be influencing who wins and who loses. Despite the power vested in the House of
Representatives and widespread use of advertising, no previous research has focused on
House elections. This dissertation fills that gap by focusing on television advertising in
House elections; examining to what extent advertising may influence electoral outcomes,
and ultimately control of Congress.
Advertising represents a common campaign tool that candidates use in order to
spread their message (Popkin 1991; Kaid and Johnston 1991; Vavreck 2009). Advertising
provides an opportunity for candidates to reach voters with their message, especially voters
who may not otherwise be following the election (Freedman, Franz and Goldstein 2004;
1
2Prior 2014). While, much scholarship has focused on the role of advertising in influencing
voter turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Djupe and Peterson 2002; Geer and Lau
2006; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Kahn and Kenney 1999a; Wattenberg and Brians
1999), the primary purpose of advertising is to persuade voters. I define persuasion as the
act of convincing voters to vote for one candidate instead of the opposing candidate. In this
analysis, I focus on electoral outcomes, primarily the binary vote choice as the measure of
persuasion.
In conversations with ten campaign consultants, both Democratic and Republican,
they consistently highlighted that the primary purpose of television advertising is to persuade
voters. In fact, one put it thus, “There wouldn’t be so much money devoted to this...if it
didn’t persuade voters.” It then becomes incumbent upon researchers to understand if
advertising yields the intended effect. To date, previous research has found mixed findings
as to whether or not advertising can persuade voters (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007).
However, past research has not examined the case of U.S. House elections or other low
information environments.
U.S. House elections are significantly lower profile compared to presidential or sena-
torial races. They receive less attention as they are not at the top of the ballot. Additionally,
in these and other low information elections, voters frequently cannot name one or both of
the candidates running for office (Jacobson 2009). While U.S. House candidate are certainly
spending large amounts of money on advertising, it remains significantly less than senate or
presidential candidates (Fowler, Ridout and Franz 2016; Fowler and Ridout 2012, 2010).
This results in voters having limited information about the candidates prior to entering
the polling booth. While much research has been done on presidential advertising (Franz
and Ridout 2010; Geer 2006; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Shaw 1999) and even senate
advertising (Franz and Ridout 2007; Kahn and Kenney 1999b; Ridout and Franz 2011), little
has been done to examine these low information elections. This analysis provides the first
3examination of how advertising may operate in these and other elections where voters have
limited information about the candidates.
Candidates use a variety of different types of advertisements over the course of the
campaign (Kaid and Johnston 1991; Vavreck 2009). In particular, scholars have focused
on differences between positive, negative, and contrast ads. These represent three distinct
advertising tones, and each may yield different effects on an individual’s vote decision.
Positive ads provide a optimistic and upbeat depiction of a candidate promoting themselves.
Whereas negative or attack ads purposely use black and white imagery and other visual
tactics to portray the opponent unfavorably. Contrast ads sit half way between these two
by combining aspects of both positive and negative ads, to both promote a candidate and
attack an opponent. Chapters two and three focus specifically on these three types of
advertisements and their level of influence on vote choice in U.S. House races.
Chapter 2 provides an initial examination into the relationship between advertising
and electoral success in U.S. House elections. I conduct an aggregate analysis across all
competitive House elections in six electoral cycles from 2000-2012. I estimate the effect of
positive, negative, and contrast ads by both the Democratic and Republican candidates on
their electoral success. Although this provides only correlational evidence, it does provide
initial evidence on the relationship between advertising and electoral success. These results
demonstrate the limited effect that advertising yields in low information elections. Only in
the final days of the election does any type of ad reach statistical significance in influencing
electoral success. This result stems from both candidates in competitive elections choosing
to air similar numbers and proportions of positive, negative, and contrast ads.
Advertising may yield a larger effect than the aggregate analysis suggests. In
particular, by conducting a survey experiment I can directly test the causal impact of
advertising on vote choice. Building on previous work, I use a novel experimental design
in Chapter 3 to more closely approximate the campaign environment to more precisely
4test my research question. Since advertising is most prevalent in competitive elections, I
expose all respondents to two advertisements, one from each opponent. Over the course of a
competitive campaign, it is highly likely that voters will be exposed to both candidates at
some point, and so I include that aspect in the design itself. Secondly, the design uses past
television advertisements in order to use realistic stimuli in the experiment. This improved
experimental design represents the second important contribution of the dissertation as this
analysis sheds light on the relationship between advertising and vote choice. The results
confirm Chapter 2’s finding that television advertising yields limited benefits. In fact the
only effect of advertising appears to be backlash against the sponsor of a negative ad, not
any intended effect on the opponent.
While it is essential to understanding how candidates’ advertising influences their
chances at winning, increasingly interest groups are playing a larger role in elections. In
2010 the Supreme Court ruled in the Citizens United case that interest groups may explicitly
advocate for or against a candidate in their television advertisements. Prior to this ruling,
under the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1972 and the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 interest groups were limited to advocating on policy issues and
barred from discussing specific candidates during elections. Since this ruling interest group
spending has exploded, including an increase in the number and proportion of television
advertisements sponsored by interest groups (Fowler, Ridout and Franz 2016). This final
analysis examines the role of interest groups in influencing U.S. House elections, and this
represents the third key contribution of this dissertation.
It remains unknown how voters are viewing and processing interest group adver-
tisements. The campaign consultants that I interviewed had mixed opinions. While some
suggested that voters are aware of the differences and will treat them differently, others
believed that voters would not notice the difference and consider them equally with candi-
dates’ ads. Chapter 4 answers this question by examining how interest group advertising
5operates similarly or differently compared to traditional candidate-sponsored advertising.
I conduct a similar survey experiment as in Chapter 3, but instead of comparing tone I
test how ad sponsorship influences vote choice. I directly compare the relative effects of a
candidate-sponsored ad, political party-sponsored ad, and an interest group-sponsored ad.
This analysis highlights how voters are not aware of the sponsor of advertisements and find
them equally persuasive. While some differences do exist, overall, these results demonstrate
the power of interest groups in potentially influencing who gets elected to office.
The United States House of Representatives represents one of the most powerful
institutions in American government. It becomes imperative to understanding the factors
that influence which individuals get elected and which do not. This analysis adds to our
understanding of what factors drive voters to vote for one candidate over another in U.S.
House elections. In particular, television advertising represents the largest expense in
campaigning today and this analysis directly tests if advertising persuades voters.
The analysis has three key contributions to the current research on television ad-
vertising. First, it represents the first analysis of U.S. House elections. Previous work has
examined presidential and senate races, but no other research has examined the House or any
other low information election. Secondly, it builds upon previous work to develop a more
accurate experimental design to test if advertising causes persuasion. Previous work has
often used only a single advertisement or fake ads. The experiments presented in chapters
three and four use real, past House ads and expose all respondents to both candidates’ ads
in order to more closely approximate a competitive election. Finally, going beyond tone,
the final chapter examines interest group advertising, which represents a growing concern
since Citizens United. This final analysis systematically tests the level of interest group
power in House elections by comparing how voters respond to interest group ads compared
to candidate ads. This adds to our understanding of how interest groups can wield influence
in elections by directly persuading voters with their own advertising.
6The analysis adds to our understanding of how television advertising persuades
voters in U.S. House elections. Chapter 2 will address this research question using an
aggregate analysis across six election cycles from 2000-2012. Chapter 3 will then build upon
this analysis and using an experimental design provide causal evidence linking television
advertising to individuals’ vote choice. Chapter 4 will use a similar experimental design
as in Chapter 3, but instead of examining tone, it tests how the sponsor of the ad, interest
group or candidate, influences persuasion. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the results and
provide some concluding thoughts on the implications for these results.
Chapter 2
Advertising and Electoral Success in
Low Information Elections
Television advertising is ubiquitous with United States elections; candidates at
almost every level of government, from Congress to mayoral candidates air thousands of
advertisements. In 2014, federal elections alone accounted for over a billion advertising
dollars on advertising (Ad Spending Tops $1 Billion 2014). However, advertising may
operate differently depending on the context of the election, be it low or high information
environment. Previous research has not determined if advertising correlates with electoral
success in low information environments, such as U.S. House elections, despite a large body
of literature (Brader 2006; Franz and Ridout 2007; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Kaid and
Boydston 1987; Krupnikov 2012; Ridout and Franz 2011; Roddy and Garramone 1988).
This study provides the first analysis of U.S. House elections and adds to our understanding
of how advertising may operate in these and other low information elections.
Previous research has primarily focused on high information elections, such as
presidential or senate elections. Researchers have examined aggregate advertising effects
using a single presidential cross-sectional analysis or a handful of senate races. These
studies examine the link between advertising and electoral outcomes in high information
7
8elections (Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Franz and Ridout 2010; Ridout and Franz 2011).
Importantly, these results may not apply in low information contexts, where voters have
limited information about the candidates, and limits our ability to extrapolate from these
studies to U.S. House or local elections. While voters may be familiar with some of the
positions of candidates in presidential elections, voters often have difficulty recalling the
names or even recognizing the names of one or both of their House candidates (Jacobson
2009). Advertising may yield different effects in these circumstances where voters may not
be paying attention to the election or candidates. If voters cannot recall candidates names,
then they are also unlikely to recall any information from advertising when making a vote
decision. As a result, voters may rely more on the partisan heuristic and less on television
advertising. This would suggest that despite large amounts of campaign funds spent on
advertising, it may yield limited effects on electoral outcomes.
This paper is the first to examine advertising in elections for the House of Represen-
tatives, and in so doing provides initial evidence linking advertising to electoral success in
low information environments. The analysis goes beyond a small number of races to include
over a hundred House races by combining advertising data from six election cycles. This
will provide new insight into the relationship between advertising and electoral success by
examining a range of elections, candidates, contexts, and years. This analysis offers a highly
systematic and rigorous test of the correlation between advertising and electoral outcomes.
This paper first addresses if increased advertising is correlated with greater electoral
success, and then goes beyond this basic question to examine which types of ads correlate
with success. Advertising is a targeted tool campaigns employ, and so I can determine which
of the types of advertisings are most associated with electoral outcomes. I distinguish types
of ads by their tone: positive, negative, and contrast. Positive ads promote the candidate
who is sponsoring the ad; negative ads serve to attack an opponent; and contrast ads include
elements of both positive and negative ads. Each type of ad represents a distinct and
9different way for candidates to appeal to voters. Conventional wisdom suggests that negative
advertisements should be correlated with electoral success (Lau 1982). While previous
studies at the presidential and senate level have demonstrated this relationship (Fridkin and
Kenney 2004; Kaid 1997; Krupnikov 2012), across a wide range of studies no conclusive
evidence that negative ads positive correlate with success (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007).
Therefore, I test this assertion that negative ads are the key to increasing a candidate’s vote
share, in particular in low information elections.
In order to test this question, I use the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG)
data for six House election cycles (2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012) that contains
every airing of a political advertisement in the top media markets and on the most popular
channels. I then aggregate this advertising data and regress it on a candidate’s vote share.
Although this provides over 700 House races with at least one advertisement aired, I focus
on the approximate 160 competitive races. These results speak directly to what types of
advertisements correlate with electoral performance in competitive congressional elections.
Candidates advertise differently if they are in a competitive versus uncompetitive election,
and so this analysis focuses on the tight races where advertising can potentially influence
the outcome of the election.
Overall, the results demonstrate that in competitive elections, both candidates ad-
vertise similarly. As a result, no single type of advertisement is a statistically significant
positive predictor of electoral success, after controlling for key electoral predictors. Even by
aggregating ads aired on only the last day before the election yields no positive correlation
for any type of advertisement with electoral performance. Counter to conventional wisdom
negative ads are not associated with greater electoral success, however positive and contrast
ads also yield no net advantage for a candidate. This analysis adds to our understanding of
the relative importance of television advertising, and provides guidance on how advertising
may operate in other less salient elections as opposed to presidential or senate campaigns.
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Additionally this study questions the role and importance of television advertising in influ-
encing electoral outcomes in low information elections. This study suggests that advertising
may serve to only cancel out an opponent’s advertising effects and that other non-advertising
campaign activities determine the success of a candidate.
Television Advertising in Low Information Environments
Candidates use advertising as a key campaign tool to reach voters with their message
(Popkin 1991; Vavreck 2009). Advertising allows candidates to define themselves as well as
their opponents. It can be used to control the narrative of a campaign and how candidates
are presented to voters. Although existing literature does illustrate how ads can influence
electoral results (e.g. Hill, et al. 2013, Ridout and Franz 2011), it does not tell us which
types of ads are most associated with altering an individuals’ vote choice. Over the course
of an election, a candidate will employ various types of advertisements (Kaid and Johnston
1991; Vavreck 2009), typically an array of positive and negative ads. Candidates should be
choosing to air different types of ads for different purposes, such as positive ads to build
name recognition and negative ads to attack an opponent. Extensive work focuses on the
importance and effects of negative advertising (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, Geer
2006). However, previous research finds inconsistent results on whether negative ads truly
are the most effective type at influencing electoral outcomes (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner
2007). I seek to clarify this relationship by focusing on previously unstudied House races,
and over a longer time frame than has typically been tested before.
Candidates use advertising because voters learn from it and advertising represents
an easy way to reach a large number of voters. An extensive history of survey research has
repeatedly demonstrated the limited knowledge of voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996), which can in turn potentially influence voter behavior (Stokes and Miller
1962). Advertising serves an important role in educating the public, and operates as an
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information-provider, which is particularly important in low information elections. Due to
limited information, any additional piece of information gleaned from an ad will reduce the
level of uncertainty in a voter’s decision. Voters learn and gain important information from
advertising (Patterson and McClure 1976; Gilens, Vavreck and Cohen 2007). Campaigns
are about providing information to voters and with that information, they hope to convince
voters to support a particular candidate (Popkin 1991). It remains to be seen what the role of
advertising is in low information elections.
Advertising has become commonplace in low information elections including U.S.
House, county, and local elections. These types of elections receive less attention com-
pared to presidential or senate races that come at the top of the ballot. Compared to high
information elections, low information elections involve less spending and as a result less
television advertising. This results in an information environment where voters may have
a limited amount of knowledge about the candidates (Jacobson 1975). In fact, from 1978-
2000 the American National Election Study (ANES) asked respondents if they could recall
their House candidates’ names, and 63% could not name either candidate. When pressed
further to name something they like or dislike about the candidates about 38% could not
name anything for either candidate (The American National Election Studies Time Series
Cumulative Data File 2010). These percentages do not change much over the time period,
including in 2000, the first year of the advertising data used in this analysis.
Previous work demonstrates how in these types of elections voters rely on heuristics,
such as party identification or the race and gender of the candidates (McDermott 1998; Rahn
1993). Similarly, since advertising is easily accessible to all types of voters (Prior 2014),
television advertising may play a more important role in low information elections. Since
we know voters are more reliant on other heuristics, they may be increasingly reliant on
television advertising to determine their vote choice. Voters only need a small amount of
information in order to make a vote decision, and campaigns have the ability to provide that
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necessary information in a low information context (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins
1998). This would suggest that television advertising may be more important compared to
high information elections.
While voters may be more reliant on heuristics, advertising can only yield an effect if
respondents receive or recall the message. Voters may not be aware of the advertisements in
low information elections due to their less prevalence compared to the high information, top
of the ballot elections. Two key aspects of preference formation and change are receiving the
message and recalling the message (Zaller 1992). Yet, voters who cannot recall the names
of their House candidates may also not be paying attention to their television advertising. If
this holds true, then ads may be less relevant in determining electoral results U.S. House and
other low information contests as voters rely on the partisan heuristic as their only source
of information. This study provides the first examination to determine the relationship of
advertising in House and other low information elections.
I separate three types of candidate-sponsored advertisements: positive, negative,
and contrast. Each type of ad represents a unique way to present information to voters and
goes beyond the text to their use of visual imagery and design elements (Kaid and Johnston
1991, 2001). Positive ads focus on promoting a candidate and typically have happy, colorful
imagery of the candidate; whereas negative or attack ads use black and white imagery to
make disparaging claims about an opponent. These include some of the most notorious
advertisements, such as the Daisy ad in 1964. The third type of ad is contrast or comparative,
which includes both elements of a positive and negative advertisement. They usually begin
by attacking an opponent then contrasting that with a positive promotion of the preferred
candidate.
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Advertising and Vote Choice
Numerous scholars have sought to establish the relationship between advertising
and vote choice. Under certain conditions and in particular elections advertising has the
ability to alter individuals’ vote. At both the senate and presidential level, aggregate analysis
suggests that the more a candidate advertises, the higher the chances of electoral success
(Franz and Ridout 2007, 2010; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Ridout and Franz 2011; Shaw
1999; Stevens 2009). These studies have primarily tested which of the two candidates’
advertising increases their likelihood of winning. The size of the advertising effect may even
have a large enough effect to swing a presidential election (Gordon and Hartmann 2013).
However, the problem with these analyses is that they make it difficult to extrapolate beyond
these circumstances. These studies similarly suffer from examining only high information
presidential or senate races. Where this analysis resolves that issue and should provide
greater insight into a wider range of elections.
The other primary focus of past research has been on negative advertisements. The
commonly held belief is that negative ads are more effective at swaying voters to support
a candidate than are positive advertisements. Researchers have used similar data to this
study, by testing this hypothesis using aggregate advertising data in past elections. These
studies find that negative advertising may be particularly effective against incumbents in
senate elections (Fridkin and Kenney 2004). Negative information tends to be over-weighted
in decision-making (Lau 1982; Geer 2006). Therefore, negative advertisements ought to
be more effective at persuading voters (Lau 1985). Some evidence has supported this
hypothesis (Krupnikov 2012; Lau 1985), but they have been far from conclusive. These
studies have also focused on high information elections by examining cross-sectional data
in one or two presidential elections, or across a small number of senate elections.
Whereas much research has focused on the positive-negative advertising dichotomy,
little research to date has been conducted examining contrast advertisements. Contrast
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advertisements combine both positive and negative components; they typically begin by
attacking the opponent and finish on a positive note about the favored candidate. Due to
the inclusion of the positive component, they may be viewed as a less severe version of
negative ads (Hill 1989). Some evidence supports this notion that compared to negative
ads, respondents view contrast ads as less negative (Meirick 2002). Additionally, since
contrast ads are less severe, they may be able to reduce the risk of backlash that accompanies
negative advertising and that would make contrast ads notably less risky than negative ads.
Experimental evidence provides some support for the contention that contrast ads evoke less
of a backlash effect, albeit with a small sample size (Pinkleton 1997). However, it remains
to be seen how such ads correlate to electoral performance.
Why Advertising May Not Effect Vote Choice
Despite the body of research highlighting the effectiveness of television advertising,
and in particular negative advertising, other researchers have found little effect of advertising
on electoral success. Such studies reveal that advertising is ineffective in senate elections
in influence the outcome (Lau and Pomper 2004). One potential explanation over these
differing results may be the increasingly polarized atmosphere (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
Polarization may decrease the relative effectiveness of an advertisement since most voters
will view them through a partisan lens (Campbell et al. 1960). Evidence does indicate that
advertising’s effectiveness may be limited by a voters’ partisan identity (Chang 2003). On
the other side, if the voter agrees with the candidate’s ideology, then the effectiveness of
an ad may increase, since voters will be more likely to believe the advertisement (Houston,
Doan and Roskos-Ewoldsen 1999). By examining elections over the last several years, this
analysis provides evidence on how advertising correlates with electoral success in an age of
high levels of polarization.
Advertising, in particular negative ads, also have the potential to result in the opposite
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of its the intended effect. That is, instead of positively correlated with more votes for
the sponsor of the ad, negative advertising can backfire and decrease their vote share.
Experimental evidence suggests that negative ads can incur backlash against the sponsoring
candidate (Kahn and Geer 1994). Multiple experiments have demonstrated how negativity
can backfire against the source of the claim, especially if the attack is seen as unfair (Brooks
and Geer 2007; Carraro, Gawronski and Castelli 2010; Haddock and Zanna 1997; Kahn and
Geer 1994; Roese and Sande 1993; Shapiro and Rieger 1992). Advertising may influence
elections in this unintended direction, such that the sponsor of the advertisement gets
penalizes for running these ads. Backlash could potentially be problematic if negative
advertising only nets a benefit for a candidate’s opponent, not the sponsoring candidate.
This would suggest that the more a candidate goes negative, the greater likelihood their
opponent will win.
In a meta-analysis that included over a hundred studies, Lau, et al. (2007) uncovered
no clear evidence that negative advertisements influence vote choice more so than do positive
ads. By aggregating virtually all-existing studies on advertising, they attempted to achieve
an overall state of knowledge on the extensive research up to that point. However, none of
these studies addressed low information elections, such as U.S. House races.
Data
In order to establish the relationship between advertising and electoral performance,
I examine past congressional advertising efforts. The advertising data comes from the
Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG)1. The dataset includes every advertisement aired
in the top media markets2 and the most common television channels (e.g. ABC, CBS).
1The 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2008 data are provided through the Wisconsin Advertising Project. The
Wesleyan Advertising Project provided the 2010 and 2012 data.
2The 2000 data come from the top 75 media markets; the 2002, 2004, and 2008 data come from the top
100 media markets. The 2010 and 2012 data comes from all 210 media markets in the United States.
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This data already pre-codes all congressional advertisements on a variety of attributes. For
instance, it includes information for where the advertisement was aired, such as the media
market, the congressional district, and the sponsor. Importantly, it provides a consistent
coding scheme for the tone of the advertisements across all six elections3.
I aggregate the advertising data by media market and congressional district to directly
match ads to vote shares. The analysis only uses congressional districts that exist in a single
media market4, so that all voters were potentially exposed to all of the ads. Otherwise the
candidate vote shares do not match with the advertising in their area and the analysis would
not provide interpretable results. Focusing on single-media market districts ensures that the
ads and vote shares are the same unit of analysis.
Altogether, that includes over 100 congressional districts per election cycle, for a
total of 705 House races during this time period. Since advertising is ubiquitous in U.S.
elections, there are no competitive elections where neither candidate aired any television
advertisements. I focus on competitive elections, which I define as the candidates finishing
within 10% of each other. This limits the analysis to approximately 160 House races5.
The analysis estimates the effect of advertising on a candidate’s vote share. As such,
the dependent variable is the share of the two-party vote won by the Democratic candidate in
each district in each year6. Positive coefficients indicate a Democratic advantage; a negative
coefficient indicates a Republican improvement. The analysis uses an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression to estimate advertising’s effect.
Given that I am focusing on the differential effects of advertising based on its tone,
3The coding scheme aligns with my definition for each type of ad. Positive ads solely promote a candidate,
negative ads solely attack an opponent, and contrast ads include both aspects.
4In the Appendix, I replicate the analysis using all congressional races where advertisements were aired.
I aggregate by district instead of by media market. This adds significant noise and predictably weakens the
effects since all voters were not exposed to the same possible set of ads. The results do not greatly differ.
5The Appendix includes the results from all 705 congressional races where at least one advertisement aired.
6The Appendix includes a secondary dependent variable, a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the
Democratic candidate won, zero if the Republican won. This analysis uses logit regression and the results do
not greatly differ.
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my six key independent variables of interest are: positive, negative, and contrast ads by the
Democratic candidate, and positive, negative, and contrast ads by the Republican candidate.
I aggregate the number of ads aired in every congressional race for each of these six types.
These six distinct variables are therefore a count of the number of times each candidate
aired a particular type of advertisement7. By measuring advertising in this way, it allows
for equal weighting across congressional districts. We know the cost of advertising varies
tremendously across districts; ads in a Los Angeles congressional district will be much
more expensive than a district in Little Rock. Constructing the advertising variables in this
way ensures that ads aired in more expensive media markets will not be over-weighted in
the analysis. As an alternative, the Appendix replicates the analysis using a candidate’s
proportion of positive and negative advertisements.
I then merge the advertising data with congressional electoral results and other
relevant control variables. One of the control variables is non-candidate advertising. This
variable captures the total number of ads aired by non-candidates, such as political parties
and Political Action Committees (PACs) in each congressional district. These non-candidate
ads are becoming increasingly prevalent and may influence voters differently than candidate-
sponsored advertising (Dowling and Wichowsky 2013, 2015). Additionally, to account
for a district’s mean level of partisanship and competitiveness, I control for the vote share
of the Democratic presidential candidate in each congressional district. I account for the
incumbency advantage by including a dummy variable if an incumbent was running in the
election. To account for more vulnerable incumbents, I include a dummy variable if that
incumbent is a freshman member, as well as using a dummy variable for the presence of
a quality challenger to control for quality opponents. Finally, it may be that advertising
is a proxy for other campaign activities or dependent on overall resources, which may
7The Appendix includes an alternative specification using the weighted count of each type of advertisement
by the cost of each airing. The results are weakened as this analysis over-weights more expensive media
markets, but the results remain consistent.
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influence electoral success. In order to control for this possibility, I include measures of
both Democratic and Republican campaign expenditures.
The analysis combines the data from six election cycles and includes year fixed
effects. The fixed effects will help account for the difference between presidential and
non-presidential cycles as well as idiosyncrasies of a particular election. It may be that the
same districts are competitive year after year, so in order to account for this, I cluster the
standard errors at the district and media market level.
Lastly, it is possible that advertising has a quickly deteriorating effect (Hill et al.
2013; Gerber et al. 2011). If advertising’s effects are indeed momentary and fleeting, I test
for this possibility by focusing the analysis, only aggregating the advertisements aired in the
final two weeks of the campaign, instead of over the course of the entire general election. I
then replicate the analysis by decreasing the time frame of aggregation all the way to just
the final day before the election.
Results
First, I examine if increasing total candidate advertising correlates with electoral
success. Table 2.1 presents the first examination of House television advertising by regress-
ing total advertising by each candidate on the Democratic vote share. Positive coefficients
would be expected for the Democratic candidate and negative coefficient for the Republican
candidate to indicate a positive correlation between advertising and vote share. Since ad-
vertising effects may be momentary, Table 2.1 presents the total advertising by aggregating
different time periods during the campaign. The first model aggregates the entire general
election campaign in the eight weeks before the election, then three weeks, two weeks,
one week, two days, and just one day before the election. Regardless of the time period of
aggregation, television advertising in House elections does not reach statistical significance8.
8The Appendix includes the tables including full set of control variables.
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Table 2.1: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections
8 Weeks 3 Weeks 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Days 1 Day
Intercept 37.06∗∗∗ 37.15∗∗∗ 37.44∗∗∗ 40.59∗∗∗ 40.57∗∗∗ 39.49∗∗∗
(7.06) (6.96) (6.97) (7.19) (7.07) (7.24)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.41
Adj. R2 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.35
Num. obs. 169 164 164 162 162 160
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs. Controls
include non-candidate advertising, incumbency, freshman, challenger experience, and both Democratic
and Republican expenditures.
The Appendix includes the same table including uncompetitive elections. However, at least
in competitive races, advertising does not correlate with electoral success.
However, this result may obscure the effects of advertising tone on electoral success.
In a simple bivariate regression I examine which types of advertisements are associated
with electoral performance. Table 2.2 presents these initial results and highlights how
only positive advertisements, for both Democrats and Republicans, correlate with electoral
success with a non-zero and statistically significant effect of 0.04 increase in vote share
for every 10 ads aired. This correlation provides initial evidence that only the allocation
of positive advertisements is associated with electoral performance. In low information
elections, including House races, positive ads may hold the key to winning. This suggests
that name recognition or positive affect may be more beneficial than attacking an opponent
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through negative advertising. However, this result is prior to adding in control variables that
may attenuate this relationship.
The next step in the analysis examines if this use of advertising holds after control-
ling for key campaign factors; Table 2.3 presents these results9. The findings indicate that
the impact of positive ads on electoral performance disappear after controlling for district
partisanship and campaign expenditures. Model 3 includes the full set of control variables,
including incumbency and partisanship of the district. The results indicate none of the
different types of advertisements yields a statistically significant effect on a candidate’s
vote share. This provides evidence that in competitive elections, where both candidates
advertise heavily, advertising does not hold the key to winning the election. Since no type
of advertisement correlates with greater electoral performance, then candidates’ advertising
may only serve to cancel out their opponent’s advertisements. In uncompetitive elections,
advertising may yield a different effect, especially if one candidate is significantly outspend-
ing their opponent. The Appendix replicates these results using the entire set of House races
with television advertising. Importantly, in the races with the most advertisements, these
competitive races, advertising does not correlate with success.
As mentioned, previous research has illustrated how advertising may exhibit a short
lifespan. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 aggregates all advertising over the course of the final two weeks
of the election. But that may be too long of a timeframe. Voters are bombarded with ads
over the final weeks of a campaign and probably do not recall everything they have seen
or heard. If the only ads that matter are on the top-of-the-head, as Zaller (1992) would
contend, then the analysis should focus only on the advertisements immediately prior to the
election. To determine whether this is the case, Table 2.4 presents the results by decreasing
the timeframe of aggregation. The first model begins by aggregating ads during the general
election campaign, the final eight weeks. Then it moves to the final three weeks, two weeks,
9The full table including effects for control variables is included in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2: Binary OLS Regression by Advertising in Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 50.26∗∗∗ 49.40∗∗∗ 49.71∗∗∗ 50.02∗∗∗ 50.34∗∗∗ 49.94∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.02
(0.01)
Positive 0.04∗∗
(0.02)
Negative 0.02
(0.02)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01
(0.02)
Positive −0.04∗∗
(0.02)
Republican −0.00
(0.01)
R2 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00
Adj. R2 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.01
Num. obs. 165 165 165 165 165 165
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are in 10s.
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone in Competitive Districts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.08∗∗∗ 49.97∗∗∗ 39.83∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.68) (6.77)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Positive 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative 0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Positive −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03)
Controls No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.13 0.45
Adj. R2 0.09 0.07 0.38
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the
campaign. Ads are in 10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on
congressional district and media market. Expenses are in natural
logs. Controls include non-candidate advertising, incumbency,
freshman, challenger experience, and both Democratic and Repub-
lican expenditures.
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two days, and the last day before the election.
Across all levels of aggregation no type of advertisement positively correlates with
an increase in their electoral performance. Interestingly, the effect of negative ads becomes
statistically significant for Republican candidates in the final days of the election. However,
the direction of the effect is against the Republican candidate, so that it associates with a
decrease in his or her vote share. This represents a backlash effect towards the sponsor of
the advertisement. It presents the possibility that the only effect of negative advertising may
be against the sponsor, rather than the target of the ad. It also my indicate that in the final
moments of a campaign, going negative may be particularly harmful. The sample size may
be insufficient to detect the effect on the Democratic side, or there may be asymmetrical
results based on partisanship. However, regardless, the evidence illustrates the lack of any
benefit of advertising for the sponsor of advertising.
Advertising Like Your Opponent
One way to explain this phenomenon would be to examine how candidates are
advertising similarly or differently. In the final weeks of the election, both candidates
in these competitive elections advertise similarly. Figure 2.1 presents the number of ads
each candidate aired by type, aggregated by each week of the campaign, for the final eight
weeks until the election. This classifies candidates as either the winning or losing candidate,
instead of by political party. By examining winning and losing candidates, I can determine if
losing candidates advertise differently than winning candidates in these competitive House
elections.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates how both candidates in a competitive low information
election advertise similarly over the course of the election. Although there is fluctuation
in each of the three types of advertisements, overall it appears that winning and losing
candidates air approximately the same number of ads during the campaign. This supports
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Cumulative Days to Election in
Competitive Elections
8 Weeks 3 Weeks 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Days 1 Day
Intercept 40.15∗∗∗ 40.13∗∗∗ 39.83∗∗∗ 41.31∗∗∗ 41.00∗∗∗ 39.74∗∗∗
(6.54) (6.72) (6.77) (6.71) (6.69) (6.93)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Positive 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Negative −0.01∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.08 −0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Positive −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 −0.03 −0.07 −0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Negative 0.01∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.04∗ 0.09∗ 0.13∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45
Adj. R2 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.38
Num. obs. 169 164 164 162 162 160
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs. Controls
include non-candidate advertising, incumbency, freshman, challenger experience, and both Democratic
and Republican expenditures.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Competitive Elections
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Table 2.5: Aggregate Number of Ads in Competitive Elections
Weeks Positive Ads Negative Ads Contrast Ads
To Election Winners Losers p Winners Losers p Winners Losers p
5 51.08 43.84 0.42 45.99 51.30 0.57 45.39 49.21 0.66
4 56.93 48.54 0.37 53.81 62.24 0.39 58.40 54.24 0.67
3 59.64 43.68 0.06 65.25 77.81 0.25 73.42 55.23 0.06
2 63.76 45.02 0.02 75.15 75.27 0.99 89.81 83.10 0.54
1 85.50 57.58 0.01 71.05 78.30 0.56 111.48 102.60 0.51
the previous result finding that no type of ad positively correlates with electoral success.
No such relationship would exist if both candidates advertise identically. Table 5 presents
pairwise t-tests to demonstrate if any of the appeared differences are statistically significant.
Table 2.5 presents the aggregate number of positive, negative, and contrast ads
each candidate aired in the final weeks of the campaign. Week one indicates the week
before the election and week five indicates five weeks prior to Election Day. The pairwise
t-tests resulted in no statistical difference in contrast or negative ad usage. There is a slight
difference in the use of positive ads, with winning candidates airing more, but overall both
candidates are advertising similar numbers of advertisements. The Appendix examines how
the proportion of positive and negative ads changes week by week in competitive House
elections, and the same result holds that winning and losing candidates are airing the same
types of advertisements during the campaign.
Importantly, this trend only holds in competitive House elections. In uncompetitive
races, the winning and losing candidates advertise extremely differently. The winning candi-
dates in uncompetitive races have more resources and as a result air more advertisements
than their opponents. This different in advertisements aired can be completely accounted for
by the winning candidates airing significantly more positive advertisements, while engaging
in the same number of negative and contrast ads. The Appendix includes these results.
Both candidates in a competitive election are advertising approximately the same
number of positive, negative, and contrast ads. Since advertising does not appear to correlate
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with electoral success, then this pattern supports the notion that in these competitive elections,
it is non-advertising choices and actions by candidates that drive electoral success, such
as mobilization campaigns. Alternatively, television advertising by non-candidates might
influence the results. This analysis focused solely on candidate-sponsored advertising, yet
non-candidates, such as interest groups, are increasingly spending large sums of money
in congressional elections. These outside groups may be able to avoid the backlash effect
associated with negative ads (Dowling and Wichowsky 2015). But based on the results
presented here, candidate-sponsored television advertising appears to have little effect on
electoral success in competitive congressional elections. It is noteworthy that this trend
is not driven by incumbency; in competitive elections, incumbents do not air significantly
more ads than do challengers.
Conclusion
This study presents the first examination on the association between television
advertising and electoral success in low information elections, namely U.S. House elections.
By examining elections from 2000 to 2012, the analysis combines data from many types of
districts, contexts, and candidates. Candidates’ advertising choices help define who they are
as well as their opponent. Such choices may influence how voters evaluate the candidates
and ultimately make their vote decision. However, the analysis provides evidence that both
total advertising and the tone of advertising does not correlate with electoral success. These
results remain robust by aggregating only the final days of the election, and after controlling
for standard predictors of electoral success. Counter to conventional wisdom, not only is
negative advertising not the key to winning an election, but neither are positive nor contrast
advertisements.
This analysis brings to light how advertising may not be influential in competitive
congressional elections. These results may also apply to other low information elections
28
compared to the previous work on presidential and senate campaigns. If two-thirds of voters
cannot name the candidates, then they also may not be able to recall any information from
television advertising. This highlights the problem that despite the increased spending on
television advertising, it may be yielding a limited effect on electoral outcomes.
These results may also suggest that other advertising aspects other than tone may
be key to the effectiveness of television advertising. While tone may not be associated
with electoral success, other aspects such as the issues raised may be more impactful on
voters’ decision-making. Some researchers have begun investigating the emotional aspects
of advertising (Brader 2006), and more work is needed to examine how other aspects of
an advertisement’s videostyle (Kaid and Johnston 2001) may influence individuals’ vote
choice.
Unfortunately, this analysis also suggests the limitations of using aggregate data.
It establishes the need to investigate the causal relationship between advertising and vote
choice, as this analysis only provides correlational evidence. Both candidates end up
advertising similar numbers of positive, negative, and contrast advertisements, which limits
the ability to infer any causal relationship between advertising and electoral outcomes.
Advertising is but one campaign tool that candidates employ in order to win elections. In
order to identify the impact of advertising on electoral success, researchers may want to
employ experimental designs, as have been used in the past (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997;
Brader 2006). Although experiments too have their own limitations, they can focus on
certain aspects of advertisements that may hold the key to effectiveness.
Finally, these findings question the role of television advertising in elections. They
speak to the millions of dollars that candidates spend on advertising with no clear benefit on
their electoral performance. As a campaign consultant put it, “There wouldn’t be so much
money devoted to this...if it didn’t persuade voters.” Yet, this remains an open question. An
increasing number of local politicians in low information elections are employing television
29
advertising. More research is needed to determine what other aspects of advertisements
yield the largest impact on individuals’ vote choice.
Chapter 3
The (Un)Persuasive Effects of Negative
Advertising: An Experimental Analysis
“What is the purpose of television advertisements?”
“To persuade...” “Persuasion” “...persuade”1
Campaign consultants agree that the primary purpose of television advertising is to
persuade voters. Candidates need to convince individuals to vote for them, and to achieve
that, candidates need to reach voters; the primary method is through television advertising.
In 2014 candidates spent over a billion dollars on advertising alone (Ad Spending Tops $1
Billion 2014). Importantly, both candidates in a competitive election are spending enormous
amounts of funds on television ads, often topping millions of dollars per candidate.
Advertising is a widely used campaign tool by congressional candidates (Cobb
and Kuklinski 1997; Kahn and Geer 1994; Kahn and Kenney 1999b; Lau, Sigelman and
Rovner 2007; Ridout and Franz 2011; Vavreck 2009). Extensive work, both observational
and experimental, has demonstrated the central role that advertising plays in congressional
campaigns. Candidates air hundreds of ads in a single election, with a wide variety of
1Quotes from interviews by the author with Democratic and Republican campaign consultants.
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types and content over the course of the campaign (Kaid and Johnston 1991; Vavreck
2009). First and foremost, they do so to win elections (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995;
Druckman, Jacobs and Ostermeier 2004; Johnston and Kaid 2002; Lupia and Menning 2009).
Advertising represents the best campaign tool to reach a large number of voters. However,
in recent years as polarization has increased, the level of cross-party voting has decreased,
resulting in fewer persuadable voters (Jacobson 2012). That makes it more relevant to
understanding if and which type of ads, and the billions spent, can influence electoral results
in present day elections. Yet, we have little information on which types of ads are more
effective compared to the others. To answer this question, I employ an experimental design
that more closely approximates the information environment in competitive elections.
Conventional wisdom suggests that negative advertising is most effective at influ-
encing individuals’ vote choice. However, previous research finds mixed results. In a 2007
meta-analysis, Lau, et al. find no clear evidence to suggest television advertising influences
voters’ choice of candidate (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007). However, this result stems
from aggregating dozens of studies with different experimental designs, many of which
may not accurately reflect the advertising environment in competitive elections. I resolve
these issues, detailed below, by using a more realistic experimental design to model the
competitive campaign environment by exposing respondents to both candidates’ ads and
using real television ads from past elections.
The experimental design more closely approximates the information environment in
competitive elections by exposing all respondents to ads from both candidates to estimate
the net effect of a single advertisement. I employed past television advertisements in
the experiment to use as realistic stimuli. I conduct three separate experiments, two on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and one on the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES). My results highlight the limited differences between each of the types of
advertisements across all three experiments, including the nationally representative CCES
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sample.
In this study, I focus on vote choice as a measure of persuasion and use the two
terms interchangeably. Across all three samples the results consistently demonstrate how
tone does not influence individuals’ vote choice. Despite huge amounts of money spent on
television advertising, I find few differences between ad tone and candidate choice. The
results do demonstrate that negative ads impact respondents’ affect towards the candidates,
but only through backlash against the sponsor of the ad. None of the types of ads provide
much intended effect on the target of the ad.
While advertising may not directly persuade voters to support a particular candidate,
it does have an effect on how voters perceive the candidates. Negative ads leave voters
with a distinctly more negative impression of the candidate sponsoring a negative ad. This
has important implications for how negative ads are indirectly influencing our elections.
Advertising represents the cheapest and easiest way for campaigns to reach voters, and this
study adds to our understanding of how campaigns influence perceptions of our elected
officials.
Television Advertising in Elections
Beginning over two decades ago, researchers linked negative ads to persuasion by
finding them to be more effective than positive ads at influencing vote choice (Roddy and
Garramone 1988). This study benefited from exposing all respondents to two political ads -
one for each candidate. Another important study by Cobb and Kuklinski highlighted the
benefit that negative ads can yield (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997). They hypothesized that
negative arguments may be more persuasive due to loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky
1979) as well as the distinctiveness of negative ads (Lau 1985).
In contrast, Kahn and Geer (1994) find no difference between positive and negative
ad effectiveness. They were able to incorporate ads from a past senate election and found
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little benefit to negative ads over positive ads. They highlight how negative ads may backlash
with more airings, but positive ads do not suffer this issue. Additionally, aggregate analyses
of presidential and senatorial races show little benefit to negative advertising (Lau and
Pomper 2004; Ridout and Franz 2011). While other studies have examined this issue (Chang
2001; Kaid 1997; King and McConnell 2003; Lemert, Wanta and Lee 1999; Pfau and
Burgoon 1989; Schultz and Pancer 1997; Shen and Wu 2002), little consensus exists. It
remains debatable if negative ads increase a candidate’s likelihood of success in competitive
elections.
It is important to build on previous studies and improve the experimental design in
order to more closely approximate a competitive electoral environment. Increasingly, studies
are using real television ads (Kahn and Geer 1994; Kaid 1997; Dowling and Wichowsky
2015), which may represent more realistic realistic stimuli for voters. It is unclear how
respondents may react to ads that are not akin to what they see on television every election
season. Even the youngest of voters have grown up with television advertising and can
recognize what may or may not be a realistic advertisement.
Additionally, only a small number of studies expose respondents to both candidates’
ads (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). The other experiments expose respondents to only
a single advertisement, which does not represent the competitive electoral environment
where most voters will be exposed to both candidates’ messages. Since voters may respond
differently when exposed to both candidates as opposed to only a single candidate, it is
important to build that into the experimental design. Through these two key advancements,
this study more closely models a competitive electoral environment by incorporating the
two-way flow of information as well as using realistic stimuli.
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Competing Messaging
An experimental design that provides both candidates messages moves closer to
mirroring the information environment of a real campaign where individuals are exposed to
both candidates’ messages. Candidates often try to define the narrative of a campaign in
a number of ways, including through television advertising (Vavreck 2009). Recent work
has examined counter-framing in which instead of providing individuals a single frame and
gauging their reaction, the experiments provide both frames and evaluate the result (Chong
and Druckman 2007). This experimental design can be useful in evaluation advertising, as
the information environment of a campaign includes both candidates’ messages.
Counter-framing provides a risk that the two campaigns’ cross-cutting messages may
cancel each other out (Chong and Druckman 2010). However, in congressional elections,
voters are provided the partisanship of the candidates which may help induce persuasion as
individuals move towards their preferred candidate (Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013;
Druckman 2004; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Jerit 2007). Along with recent trends in
the decline in split-ticking voting (Jacobson 2012), it increases the difficulty in persuading
voters after exposing voters to both sides of an issue or election. The main drawback of
the past research is its focus on written as opposed to visual information. Since campaign
advertising is primarily through television, the use of video rather than written prompts the
results can have greater external validity to congressional campaigns.
One study has explicitly examined how people respond to two competing televi-
sion advertisements. The Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) study compared individuals’
responses to seeing two fictional advertisements compared to seeing only one of the ads.
However, this study focused primarily on the acquisition of information, not persuasion.
They find that exposing respondents to two ads instead of one increases the amount of
information people learn. But in real campaigns, voters see both advertisements, so it is
important to determine if voter preferences change with the new information.
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Which Ads Persuade?
Advertising provides a convenient and easy opportunity for individual voters to
gain information for their vote choice. It does not take much information for individuals
to make a voting decision (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Advertisements can
provide essential information in a short amount of time. People can learn a great deal from
a single 30-second spot and use that in their evaluations (Just, Crigler and Wallach 1990;
Popkin 1991). Importantly, everyone learns from ads; as the use of visual imagery over pure
text allows for low knowledge individuals to close the knowledge gap (Prior 2014). The
combination of visual and auditory imagery in television advertising improves voters’ ability
to learn. Advertising plays a critical role in American democracy in facilitating knowledge
of the candidates and issues. Voters have less information about candidates in congressional
elections compared to presidential races, and so how they learn about the candidates should
influence their preferences.
I present three types of advertisements that differ not just in their use of words
but in their design elements as well. Videostyle represents the entire presentation of the
advertisements, including visual, auditory, and script. Each of these types differ in their
videostyles (Kaid and Johnston 1991, 2001). For example, a positive advertisement includes
happy visuals, sounds, and content, whereas a negative ad often includes black and white
imagery and sinister music. A contrast advertisement’s videostyle incorporates both of
these elements by typically beginning dark, similar to an attack, and then turning positive
about the favored candidate. When I differentiate between types of ads, it is not just in
words and message, but the entire “package” that determines their persuasive ability. The
information conveyed through the script, as well as the emotional responses evoked through
the audiovisual elements, influence the persuasiveness of an advertisement. My definition
aligns with previous studies that have focused on this three-way categorization (Krasno and
Green 2008).
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The first type of ad is negative or attack advertisements that solely focus on making
claims about an opponent and seek to put that opponent in as negative a light as possible.
They are the most recognizable and studied type of ad. Some research suggests they should
be persuasive. Negative ads convey important information that often becomes over-weighted
in candidate evaluations (Krupnikov 2012; Lau 1985). They are also more credible than
positive ads since candidates must support their attacks through evidence, such as newspaper
citations, which serves to boost the credibility of the claim (Geer 2006; Houston, Doan and
Roskos-Ewoldsen 1999; Yoon, Pinkleton and Ko 2005). Along with past work, conventional
wisdom would dictate that negative ads persuade voters. Hypothesis 1: Negative ads are
more persuasive than positive ads. But airing negative ads comes at a great cost with the
ever-present risk of backlash if a candidate attacks an opponent too harshly (Fridkin and
Kenney 2004). Hypothesis 2: Candidates will incur a penalty for airing a negative ad.
The other well-recognized type of ad is positive advertisements. They seek to
promote a particular candidate through affirmative statements, without mentioning the
opposition or the opponent’s policy views. These can include testimonials of the candidate’s
character and personal background or a platform for a candidate to explain his or her own
issue positions. When they discuss policy, these statements tend to be on valence issues
(Geer 2006). These ads may not provide any new or useful information to voters, but may
build positive affect towards a candidate. While they may not be persuasive, they should
evoke more positive feelings towards a candidate. Hypothesis 3: Positive ads increase
positive affect towards a candidate.
The third and final type of ad is contrast or comparative advertisements. These
include both an attack on the candidate’s opponent as well as a promotion of themselves.
Although recent research has begun to treat these separately (Fowler and Ridout 2012),
little research exists on contrast ads and in particular how they may operate differently or
similarly to the other two types. Marketing research has shown contrast ads to be perceived
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by viewers as less negative than attack ads (Meirick 2002; Pinkleton 1997; Pinkleton, Um
and Austin 2002). These ads leave individuals feeling better than negative ads, therefore
reducing the risk that candidates will face a backlash from voters. However, it remains to be
known if voters differentiate between negative and contrast ads, and if they will be more or
less persuasive compared to positive or negative ads.
In order to increase external validity, I use past candidate-sponsored advertisements
to better simulate a campaign environment. My hypotheses, including if negative ads are
the most persuasive, should hold true even when respondents are exposed to an opponent’s
advertisement. Additionally, my theory focuses on different types of advertisements, re-
gardless of the sponsor being Democrat or Republican. In either case, it is important to see
whether negative ads across both parties are the most persuasive type, or not. However, it is
possible for asymmetrical results along partisan lines. For example, Republican negative (or
positive) ads may be more effective than Democratic negative (or positive) ads. I test for
this possibility later on.
Data and Methods
The experimental setting provides a prime opportunity to isolate the causal effect of
advertisements. This design offers direct evidence on which ads are the most persuasive in
comparison to each other by directly linking advertisements with respondents’ vote choice.
The use of an experimental design allows me to eliminate intervening explanations and
compare how respondents voted when exposed to a negative ad compared to a positive ad.
The experiment was conducted three times, including twice on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) platform, which has become increasingly used for experiments by social
scientists (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Mullinix et al. 2015). The sample population
represents a slightly younger, masculine, higher educated, and more Democratic sample than
the overall population. For these reasons, the identical experiment was placed on a module
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Table 3.1: Experimental Treatment Groups
Treatment Group Democrat Candidate Republican Candidate
Treatment 1 Positive Contrast
Treatment 2 Positive Negative
Treatment 3 Contrast Negative
Treatment 4 Contrast Positive
Treatment 5 Negative Contrast
Treatment 6 Negative Positive
of the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in order to both replicate
the results as well as validate them on a nationally representative sample2. Conducting
the experiments across multiple sample populations with two different sets of advertising
stimuli provides more validity for the results. Respondents were successfully randomized
across the treatment groups, with balance across a range of variables in each sample3.
Table 3.1 lists the treatments with respondents randomized equally across groups. For
MTurk Sample 1 and the CCES, each group consists of approximately 160 respondents for a
total of 1,000 participants. The MTurk Sample 2 experiment consisted of approximately 200
respondents per group, 1,200 total. The ordering that the ads were viewed was randomized
since the sequence may influence candidate preference, to prevent any priming or framing
effect of the first advertisement. I conducted a series of pairwise t-tests and found no ordering
effect on respondents’ vote choice. I then collapse the treatments into the six groups listed
in Table 1.
I purposely exclude treatment groups of both candidates airing the same type of
ad, such as negative vs. negative, as those groups do not add any additional leverage to
determine which type of advertisement is more persuasive compared to the others. While it
is important to understand how candidate vote choice may change when both candidates air
the same type of ad, I focus on the relative persuasiveness of positive compared to negative.
2The Appendix includes a comparison of the MTurk and CCES sample demographics.
3See the Appendix for a full balance table across treatment groups for both samples.
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Rather than focusing on if advertising can yield an effect, here I examine which types of ads
are more effective than the others.
Respondents were first introduced to the two names of the candidates and asked to
watch two 30-second ads. After the video they were asked to complete a short survey that
included my main dependent variable of interest, vote choice, as well as other variables
of interest. Since the ultimate goal of advertising is to convince voters for or against a
particular candidate, I focus on the electoral outcome as the primary dependent variable
to measure persuasion. Other questions include candidate thermometer ratings and how
each advertisement made them feel, such as hopeful or angry. Respondents were then asked
a range of questions about themselves to provide information on their education, income,
gender, race, and marital status.
After the video, respondents were presented with a choice between the two can-
didates, which includes their partisan affiliation, as seen in Figure 14. As is typical of
most ads today, the candidates’ partisanship was never mentioned in the ads themselves.
However, when citizens enter a polling booth, partisanship is always listed for congressional
elections as well as a wide range of other state and local elections. This makes it essential to
understand not just if advertising can persuade, but rather if this persuasion can supersede or
outweigh voters’ partisan attachments. Voters have limited information in House elections
as they represent low information elections (Jacobson 1975). Due to this limited information
espondents may be more likely to rely on partisan cues once they enter the ballot box
(McDermott 1998; Rahn 1993). As such, the experiment modeled this environment by
revealing the partisanship of the candidates after the videos when they cast their vote as in
Figure 3.1.
The pairwise t-tests, which proceeded later in the study, allow comparison between
treatment groups; first I wanted to assess the relative success of all three types of ads. I
4The candidate ordering was randomized.
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Figure 3.1: Main Dependent Variable: Vote Choice
implemented a scaling technique in order to compare the relative persuasiveness of positive,
negative, and contrast ads. It provides a single scale to compare the relative effects of all
three types. It also will allow me to test if there are any asymmetrical results, as I can scale
all six types, separated by partisanship in the same manner.
Using a technique developed by Groseclose and Stewart, I scaled respondents’ vote
choice (Groseclose and Stewart III 1998). For each respondent, the type of ad they preferred
receives a +1, the ad they did not prefer gets a -1, and the other types get zeros. Table 3.2
presents an example of five respondents. The first and second respondents both viewed a
Democratic positive ad and a Republican contrast ad. The first respondent preferred the
Republican candidate after viewing the ads, while the second respondent preferred the
Democratic candidate. Then I regress these types of ads on a dependent variable of all
ones in a probit regression. This method identifies the heirarchy in persuasiveness between
positive, negative, and contrast ads. It identifies the size of the effects so I can compare
the persuasive impact of a contrast ad compared to a positive ad. In other words, I am not
only able to determine whether contrast advertisements are more effective than a positive
ad, but also the magnitude of this effect. Importantly, this technique does not add any more
assumptions than would be used in a ordinary least squares (OLS) regression5.
I validate the results from the scaling technique by examining candidate thermometer
ratings. They measure how individuals feel about the candidates on a hundred-point scale.
Although it may represent a significant hurdle for individuals to change their vote choice, I
5The scaling method assumes errors are independent and identically distributed, a linear ordering of ads,
and transitivity. For a more detailed description of the scaling method see Groseclose and Stewart (1998).
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Table 3.2: Example Matrix for Scaling
Democratic Ads Republican Ads
Respondent Positive Contrast Negative Positive Contrast Negative DV
1 -1 0 0 0 1 0 1
2 1 0 0 0 -1 0 1
3 0 1 0 0 0 -1 1
4 0 1 0 -1 0 0 1
5 0 0 -1 1 0 0 1
can examine more subtle changes in candidate evaluations via these thermometer ratings. It
is possible for interactive effects, in other words how views of a positive ad change when
paired with a contrast ad, compared to being paired with a negative ad. However, I find no
evidence of any interactive effects, and so the effect of a single ad does not significantly
vary depending on the opponent’s choice of advertising.
Advertising Stimuli
Another improvement in this experimental design lies in its use of past campaign
advertisements, as they are realistic and representative of what candidates would and have
aired. Furthermore, by using ads from a competitive election, the candidates were equally
matched and equally funded. I use that competitiveness and equal financial backing as
a proxy for advertisement quality. These represent typical political advertisements; the
Appendix includes a description of the sets of ads used along several key characteristics.
To select the ideal congressional race for this study, I focused on competitive districts
where both candidates were white and male. These characteristics represent the modal
candidate running for Congress. By using white, male candidates also reduces the possible
confounds in the experiment6.
For the MTurk Sample 1 and the CCES experiments, I selected the 2008 United
6I also ensured that the type of advertisement is consistent with previous definitions and coding schemes by
using advertisements from 2008 and 2012, which have all previously been coded by the Wisconsin Advertising
Project and Wesleyan Media Project identically.
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States House of Representatives election for Michigan’s 7th congressional district. The race
exemplifies a hyper-competitive election where the first-term Republican incumbent Tim
Walberg lost to Democrat Mark Schauer by less than 3%7. The race also provides some
inherent benefits in that both candidates were well qualified, with the challenger being a
longtime member of the state legislature.
The MTurk Sample 2 experiment used ads from the 2012 House race in Virginia’s
2nd Congressional District. Similar to the Michigan race, this fulfilled all the criteria
of white, male candidates in a competitive district. Republican Incumbent Scott Rigell
defeated the Democratic challenger Paul Hirschbiel in a close race. The ads used during
this race are quite similar and typical among television advertisements. They contain
characteristics of conventional advertisements aired in congressional campaigns, including
not mentioning political party affiliation, negative ads citing sources, and focusing on issues
such as economics8.
Results
First, I demonstrate the relative effectiveness of each of the different types of ad-
vertisements. This result provides a first test on which are the most and least influential
types of ads on individuals’ vote choice. Figures 3.2-3.4 illustrate the effect of a single
advertisement, regardless of the sponsor’s partisanship for each sample9. As the figures
suggest, advertising tone has little effect on vote choice. Since all three point estimates
overlap, none are statistically significantly different. These results demonstrate how all
advertisements influence vote choice with equal probability. Counter to conventional wis-
7The 2010 election saw a rematch between these candidates, with Republican Tim Walberg winning back
his seat narrowly.
8The Appendix includes a comparison on a number of dimensions of how these advertisements compare to
the rest of the advertisements aired in 2008 and 2012 House races respectively.
9The positive advertisement has no error bars since in the scaling method, it represents the excluded
category. The results are consistent if a different ad is the excluded category.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: MTurk Sample 1
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: CCES Sample
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Figure 3.4: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice: MTurk Sample 2
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Figure 3.5: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice by Candidate’s Partisanship:
MTurk Sample 1
dom and Hypothesis 1, little difference exists between positive and negative ads. However,
there could be partisan effects, whereby a negative ad by a Democrat operates differently
than a negative ad by a Republican. The next step would be to analyze the six types of
advertisements as unique and separate.
To do so, I then separate between Democratic and Republican sponsors, and find
the results are mirrored for both sponsors. Figures 3.5-3.7 present the results for all three
experiments10. Importantly, no consistent pattern emerges across the three experiments.
In both of the MTurk samples, there appears to be a partisan effect with Democratic
ads being more persuasive than Republican ads. However, this difference is expected
of Mechanical Turk. The nationally representative sample from the CCES illustrates no
10The Democrat contrast advertisement has no error bars since in the scaling method, it represents the
excluded category. Identical results are produced if using a different excluded category. If that value is outside
the other error bars, then it is statistically significant.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice by Candidate’s Partisanship:
CCES Sample
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Figure 3.7: Effect of Advertising Tone on Vote Choice by Candidate’s Partisanship:
MTurk Sample 2
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significant differences. Importantly, within each party, the effects of a positive, negative,
and contrast ads are similarly effective.
In fact, both Democratic and Republican ads resemble each other. The results further
highlight how little differences exist between a Democratic negative ad and a Democratic
positive ad. The Republican sponsored ads exhibit the same pattern with little differences
based on tone. This presents initial evidence that the tone of an advertisement is not
significantly contributing to the persuasiveness of advertising. Across all three samples and
two advertising stimuli, advertising tone consistently does not significantly define which ad
is most persuasive. Thus, there may be other factors that contribute to the effectiveness of
an ad, such as visual imagery or narration.
Positivity or Negativity: What Works Best?
In line with much of the past research, I focus on the positive-negative dichotomy to
determine if there is any truth to the conventional wisdom that negative ads are the most
effective. An additional way to test the persuasiveness of advertising is to conduct pairwise
t-tests between the treatment groups. I examine the raw vote totals for the treatment groups
to re-test if any difference can be found between these two polar methods of persuasion
through advertising. I perform t-tests between treatment groups on candidate vote choice. I
examine if a candidate who aired the positive ad received greater vote support compared
to when they aired a negative ad. The research design, in which respondents were exposed
to both candidates’ ads, allows me to examine this hypothesis in a competitive electoral
environment. Table 3.3 presents these results, comparing positive versus negative for the
Republican candidate, and then the same comparison but with a Democratic sponsor. The
values in the table represent support for the Republican candidate.
Across all three experiments, regardless of the partisan affiliation of the sponsor,
advertising tone yields little effect on candidate vote choice. None of the comparisons come
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Table 3.3: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value
Positive (R) vs 31.5% 45.8% 38.2%
Contrast (D) 0.36 0.71 0.51
Negative (R) vs 26.9% 43.8% 35.1%
Contrast (D)
Positive (D) vs 31.1% 51.3% 25.7%
Contrast (R) 0.95 0.50 0.41
Negative (D) vs 30.8% 47.5% 29.4%
Contrast (R)
close to reaching statistical significance. Although the conventional wisdom may suggest
that negative ads are more effective than positive ads, the evidence indicates otherwise, and
provides further proof against Hypothesis 1. Using this improved experimental design of
the electoral environment provides evidence that negative ads are no more effective than
positive ads. However, it remains to be seen if negative ads affect people at all. Perhaps
negative ads are no more persuasive but they may still influence perceptions of candidates.
Individual vote choice may remain the same but perhaps the perception of the
candidates varies by the tone of each ad. I test this possibility by using candidate thermometer
ratings, which provide a finer scale to examine how candidate impressions alter due to the
advertisement viewed. While I may be only able to detect approximately a 10% shift in vote
choice, I can detect a 5-point shift in thermometer ratings. This represents a small shift on a
100-point scale, as each respondent was asked to rate each candidate on a 100-point scale.
I replicate the t-tests from Table 3.3 in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 using the thermometer ratings.
Table 3.4 presents the tests of Hypothesis 2, if the ad-sponsor receives a penalty for airing a
negative ad compared to a positive ad, in other words, backlash. Table 3.5 then shows the
results if the intended target of the ad was affected differently by the negative ad versus the
positive ad.
The results from Table 3.4 present clear evidence of backlash against the sponsor
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Table 3.4: Testing Backlash: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 47.7 55.6 48.0
Contrast (D) 0.02 0.28 <0.01
Negative (R) vs 40.6 52.3 41.0
Contrast (D)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 56.9 53.8 59.7
Contrast (R) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Negative (D) vs 46.1 41.2 53.3
Contrast (R)
of negative ads. The Democratic candidate received lower thermometer scores when he
aired a negative ad, compared to a positive ad, and the same holds true for the Republican
candidate. The sponsor of the negative ad received lower ratings in all cases compared to
when they aired a positive ad, with five of the six tests reaching statistical significance. In
the CCES, this ranged from the Republican receiving only 3% less support when airing a
negative ad, to the Democrat receiving almost 12% lower ratings due to his negative ad. The
results illustrate the detrimental and risky aspect to airing negative advertisements. While
advertising tone appears to yield little effect on vote choice, it clearly does have an impact
on candidates.
But did the negative ad have any effect on the target of the advertisement? A
candidate airing a negative ad does so in order to influence the ratings of his or her opponent.
The results presented in Table 3.5 examine whether the rating of the intended target of the
ad did decrease as expected; the Democratic candidate airing a negative ad would hope
to see the Republican thermometer ratings decrease compared to a positive ad. While in
most cases, the target did received lower ratings, these differences were not statistically
significant. For example, the first MTurk sample saw a 4.3% reduction in support for the
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Table 3.5: Effect on Target: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 42.0 47.2 45.1
Contrast (R) 0.13 0.84 <0.01
Negative (D) vs 37.7 47.9 38.9
Contrast (R)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 54.4 59.4 50.0
Contrast (D) 0.53 0.19 0.55
Negative (R) vs 52.7 54.8 51.5
Contrast (D)
Republican candidate when the Democrat aired a negative ad. Similarly, the Democratic
candidate received 1.7% lower ratings due to the Republican airing a negative ad. Neither of
these differences reach statistical significance. Only one of the six tests reaches statistical
significance that the target was affected by his opponent’s negative ad. In all other instances
there appears to be little effect of the negative ad on the target.
This finding is important as it shows that negative ads may only work to lower
evaluations of the sponsor, not the target. In other words, candidates should avoid negative
ads since they seem to only hurt themselves. While thermometer ratings of candidates do
correlate with vote share, they do not correlate perfectly, as there are voters who rate both
candidates highly or lowly. In previous work, studies have found an effect on candidate
affect while not on vote choice due to the imperfect correlation (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner
2007). The Appendix includes the correlation between vote choice and the thermometer
ratings.
Voters evidently do feel differently towards candidates who air a negative ad com-
pared to a positive ad. I examine the effects of negative advertising on both positive and
negative emotional responses. I focus on excitement and hopefulness for positive emotions
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Table 3.6: Emotional Responses by Advertising Tone to Democratic Ads
Treatment Excited Hopeful Disgust Angry
MTurk Sample 1
Positive (D) 0.84 1.30 0.46 0.44
Negative (D) 0.54∗ 0.60∗ 1.26∗ 1.09∗
MTurk Sample 2
Positive (D) 0.84 1.31 0.42 0.52
Negative (D) 0.43∗ 0.67∗ 1.02∗ 0.99∗
∗p< 0.05
and disgust and anger for negative emotions. Respondents were asked, after viewing the ads,
to rate how the ads made them feel regarding each of these emotions on a four-point scale,
with the values in the table representing the average for respondents who viewed that type
of ad. These questions were only asked in the MTurk samples and I present the results in
Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Table 3.6 presents the differences in emotional responses after viewing a
negative ad by the Democrat compared to the positive ad, while Table 3.7 replicates this
analysis for the Republican candidate. I conduct a t-test between the treatment groups who
saw a positive ad compared to those who saw a negative ad.
The results present evidence that positive ads are more likely to evoke positive
emotions and negative ads evoke more negative emotional responses. In Table 3.6 the
MTurk Sample 1 demonstrates that while respondents who viewed a Democratic positive ad
felt hopeful on average 1.30, while Democratic negative ad viewers felt hopeful at only 0.60,
a difference that is statistically significant. Similarly, the positive ad viewers were disgusted
on average at 0.46, while the negative ad viewers at 1.26, also a statistically significant
effect. Across all four emotions, both sponsors, and the two samples, the differences are
almost all statistically significant. As we would expect, positive ads cause voters to be
more hopeful and excited towards the sponsoring candidate, while negative ads make voters
more disgusted and angry at the sponsoring candidate. These results provide support for
Hypothesis 3, that positive ads do evoke more positive affect towards a candidate. These
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results have important implications as negative advertisements may not alter the outcome of
an election, but influence voters’ perceptions of the candidates. In an era with record low
approval for government and many politicians, negative advertising may be contributing to
this atmosphere.
Table 3.7: Emotional Responses by Advertising Tone to Republican Ads
Treatment Excited Hopeful Disgust Angry
MTurk Sample 1
Positive (R) 0.54 0.84 0.71 0.68
Negative (R) 0.55 0.74 1.12∗ 1.07∗
MTurk Sample 2
Positive (R) 0.61 0.92 0.54 0.46
Negative (R) 0.43∗ 0.52∗ 1.10∗ 1.02∗
∗p< 0.05
Conclusion
The research design employed here more closely approximates the information envi-
ronment in competitive elections. The experiments utilized past candidate advertisements
from two separate competitive congressional elections. These ads represent typical advertise-
ments used in House elections. Further, built into the experiment was the competitive nature
of campaigns by exposing all respondents to both candidates’ advertisements. Elections
represent highly competitive and contrasting viewpoints and it is important to recognize that.
As a result, the effects of an individual advertisement are not as inflated as in previous work
that only exposes respondents to a single ad. Both of these aspects improve the validity
of the experiment and progress the current research towards understanding advertising’s
effects.
By using this experimental design, the results may be more applicable to the compet-
itive electoral environment. The results across three studies and two sets of advertisements
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provide support that the tone of advertising does not determine the effectiveness of an
advertisement. Each of the three types; positive, negative, and contrast; resulted in a similar
level of electoral support. Persuasion is crucial, as candidates use television advertising
to reach out and convince voters of their candidacies. Since that is the primary intended
purpose, these results provide important evidence that the previous focus on advertising tone
may not be the key factor driving electoral success.
The results illustrate that while vote choice totals do not change, perceptions of the
candidates do. Candidates who aired negative ads were hurt with lower thermometer ratings,
compared to airing a positive ad. Backlash remains an important consideration to negative
ads, especially since these experiments highlight the limited effect on the actual target of the
ad. Additionally, the results indicated that this may be driven by negative ads evoking more
negative emotions such as disgust and anger, while positive ads evoked excitement and hope.
While thermometer ratings do correlate with vote choice, they do not do so perfectly as some
respondents rate both candidates highly or lowly. As such this has important implications
as electoral results may not change, but increased negative advertising may still influence
views of politicians and government.
These results may be driven by one of two explanations. First, vote choice may not
be affected by the tone of the ad due to our highly polarized political environment. Once
accounting for party affiliation, persuasion may be hard to achieve as voters align with
their political party. This study supports the recent decline in cross-party voting (Jacobson
2012). If individuals become increasingly loyal to their party, then advertising or any other
campaign activity will yield a much smaller persuasive impact. In that instance, voter
attitudes towards candidates may change, but ultimately who they vote for may not.
While this is a hypothetical election with the respondents unfamiliar with the candi-
dates, that does describe typical low information elections, such as the House of Representa-
tives, county, and city elections. These results may be most applicable to elections whose
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information environments involve little knowledge on the part of voters. Voters often know
little about their House candidates and other down-ballot elections, unlike the presidential
election, where voters are familiar with the candidates. As such, advertisements may be a
key way for voters to learn about the candidates and rely on for their vote choice.
A second possibility is that the experiment does highlight the beginning stages
of persuasion. Evidence from these experiments demonstrates how individuals’ ratings
of candidates on a thermometer rating change with the exposure of negative advertising.
Respondents were only presented with two ads, whereas over the course of an election,
voters view hundreds of ads. In that case, the effects may increase with exposure and
eventually cross a threshold to result in persuasion. This second possibility would describe
an additive characteristic to advertising exposure, and both of these possibilities may hold
true. However, even if this were true, advertising yielded no intended effect, which greatly
questions the use of negative ads by candidates in their attempt to win elections.
These results speak to the greater literature on campaigns and the ability for can-
didates to persuade voters, supporting the previous work highlighting that tone is not key
for persuasion (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007). In future research, it will be important
for researchers to look beyond the positive-negative dichotomy and look at other factors in
advertising that influence an advertisement’s persuasiveness.
Chapter 4
Interest Group or Candidate: Sponsor
Irrelevance in the Persuasiveness of
Television Advertising
Since the 2010 Citizens United Supreme Court ruling, interest groups have an
increased ability to influence elections. Prior to 2010, non-candidates, such as interest
groups, were limited in their ability to advertise on television. Under both the 1972 Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),
interest groups lacked the ability to directly support any particular candidate; they were
only able to discuss policy issues. However, since 2010, under the new guidelines due to
Citizens Untied interest groups can now directly advocate for and against candidates, and
they are making use of this ability by playing an increasingly sizable role in congressional
elections. Interest group advertising comprised less than 10% of all advertisements in
federal elections in 2008, by 2016 that percentage had grown to over 30% to one in three ads
being sponsored by interest groups (Fowler 2016). This represents the first major change
to television advertising in decades and it remains unknown how these ads are influencing
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electoral outcomes.
As a result of this increased prevalence of interest group advertising, researchers have
begun examining their influence (Dowling and Wichowsky 2013, 2015; Weber, Dunaway
and Johnson 2012). While research has demonstrated that interest groups have the ability to
influence legislative outcomes (Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011; Gillion 2012; Richter,
Samphantharak and Timmons 2009), it then becomes important to understand if interest
groups can influence who gets into office in the first place. Importantly, if interest groups
can wield influence on electoral outcomes, then their power within the halls of Congress
would be expected to increase. This analysis adds to the research to help understand the
extent to which interest groups can influence electoral outcomes using a more realistic and
representative experiment that more closely approximates the information environment in
House elections. This analysis builds on previous work to answer this question by being the
first analysis to examine whether interest group ads are more or less persuasive compared to
traditional candidate-sponsored television advertising in competitive House elections.
In order to test my hypotheses, I develop an experimental design that more accurately
estimates the effect of advertising in congressional elections compared to previous work. In
order to account for the competitive nature of campaigns, the design exposes all respondents
to two ads, one from each side of the election. This is highly important as in competitive
elections, almost all voters become exposed to both candidates over the course of an
election. Exposing respondents to only a single advertisement does not represent the
electoral environment. This represents a key contribution as it is essential to examine
if advertising persuades in competitive elections where advertising may be influential in
determining the outcome.
Each ad may be sponsored by the candidate, the political party, or an interest
group. While exposing all respondents to two ads moderates the effect of any single ad, it
represents a more realistic design. Since the vast majority of non-candidate advertisements
59
are negative ads, all the ads in the experiment are negative. The other key advancement
of this experimental design lies in its use of past congressional ads, which makes them
highly realistic stimuli to respondents. Unlike fictional advertisements, the ads used in
this experiment have previously been used by real candidates and organizations towards
trying to persuade voters. This improved experimental design allows me to compare the
relative impact on electoral outcomes between an interest group negative ad and a candidate-
sponsored negative ad.
The results demonstrate that although respondents are aware when ads are not
sponsored by candidates, they are less aware of the the specific sponsor of the interest
group ads. This highlights the ability that interest groups can influence individuals, since
most individuals are not familiar with specific groups, their backgrounds, or partisanship.
Additionally, while negative candidate ads suffer a backlash penalty against the candidate,
interest group ads suffer a reduced penalty since the favored candidate is not responsible
for the advertisement. This result suggests that interest groups can do the dirty work on
behalf of candidates and air negative ads attacking their opponent with little backlash on
the preferred candidate. Finally, despite these differences, in the end, interest group ads are
equally persuasive compared to a candidate or political party sponsored television ad. While
voters may notice it was not a candidate advertisement, they weigh all ads equally in their
vote decision. This analysis highlights the increasing power that interest groups wield in
congressional elections and their role in influencing voters due to the Citizens United ruling.
Television Advertising
Television advertising dominates the airwaves in American elections, especially
competitive congressional elections (Ad Spending Tops $1 Billion 2014). Voters use this
free information source in order to learn about the candidates (Patterson and McClure
1976; Gilens, Vavreck and Cohen 2007). Campaigns understand the role of advertising
60
and seek to use it to inform voters and shape the nature of the election (Popkin 1991;
Vavreck 2009). This may be especially important in low information elections, such as
House elections, where voters have limited information about the candidates (Jacobson
1975). Although potentially short in timespan, advertising has the potential for significant
effects on candidate preferences (Hill et al. 2013). While candidates typically employ a
wide range of advertisements in order to convince voters to support their candidacy, much
focus has been placed on the role of negative or attack advertisements.
Television advertising has long been the subject of research to understanding its
effects (see Lau, et al. 2007 for a complete review). In particular, many studies have focused
on the persuasive impact television advertising may yield on electoral outcomes. Researchers
primarily have examined the positive-negative dichotomy to gain a greater understanding
of how different tones of advertisements influence voters (Roddy and Garramone 1988;
Kahn and Geer 1994; Ridout and Franz 2011; Cobb and Kuklinski 1997). This has been
dominated by the discussion of the role and influence negative ads have in our elections
(Geer 2006). Going beyond the tone of ads, scholars have more recently examined other
factors, including the emotional content of the ad (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008) or
candidate characteristics such as gender (Fridkin, Kenney and Woodall 2009). However
little is known about how the sponsor of the advertisement may serve as an intervening
factor in these relationships.
Non-Candidate Advertising
Prior to Citizens United non-candidates were limited in their ability to air adver-
tisements. Under the previous rules, interest groups could primarily sponsor issue adver-
tisements. They were legally not allowed to explicitly promote or oppose any candidate.
Some research examined how these issue-ads influenced candidates in the policymaking
process and in elections. Interest groups often would run issue-ads to influence legislators
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towards their preferred policy outcomes (Hall and Reynolds 2012). In terms of elections,
some researchers found that these issue-ads can be more effective than candidate-sponsored
ads (Groenendyk and Valentino 2002). Since individuals may discount what one candidate
may say about the other, non-candidate advertising may serve as a more credible source for
information about the candidates.
On the other hand, given the highly polarized environment, voters often look towards
their partisan cues to guide their decisions. The effectiveness of issue-ads may be diverse
and depend upon the audience. Some scholars found that issue-ads primarily influence
non-partisans, while candidate-sponsored ads yield the greatest effects on partisan voters
(Pfau et al. 2001, 2002). These issue-ads may avoid the pitfalls of other forms of negative
advertising by avoiding the backlash effect, and some evidence does support this hypothesis
(Shen and Wu 2002).
Some recent work has begun to address the new role that interest group advertising
is taking in U.S. elections. Since Citizens United non-candidates such as interest groups
are increasingly airing political advertisements promoting and opposing candidates (Fowler
2016). In a study ahead of its time, in a small lab experiment researchers demonstrated
that non-candidate advertisements may be more persuasive and less likely to incur backlash
compared to candidate-sponsored ads (Garramone 1985). Researchers found that when
respondents do not recognize the sponsor, then advertisements may be particularly effective
(Weber, Dunaway and Johnson 2012). Similar to the issue-ad research, previous research
highlights how non-candidate advertising can limit the effect of backlash against the favored
candidate when the non-candidate entity airs a negative advertisement (Dowling and Wi-
chowsky 2015). However, these studies have their limitations. Most notably, not replicating
the information environment during elections. These experiments expose respondents to
only a single advertisement, be it from a candidate or interest group. This study more closely
models the advertising environment of an election by exposing all respondents to ads from
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both sides.
Since respondents have responded differently in previous experiments (Garramone
1985; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015), then respondents must be able to notice that the
sponsor of the advertisements is not one of the candidates up for election. However,
respondents may be surprised that the sponsor was not one of the candidates. The sponsor
does need to be verbally announced in the ad, however it is often rushed passed at the very
end. As such, voters may learn that the candidate was not the sponsor, but may not pick up
the identity of the specific sponsor. While respondents may correctly identify if the sponsor
was a candidate or not, they will be less likely to select the correct sponsor from a list of
options.
H1: Respondents will be less likely identify the sponsor of an interest group-
sponsored ad compared to candidate-sponsored ads.
In past research on interest group ads respondents have exacted less backlash on the
advertisement’s favored candidate (Garramone 1985; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015). This
results despite the fact that respondents may not recognize the sponsor of the interest group
ad, but most likely realize it is not the opposing candidate. Since the favored candidate
is not airing the negative ad, but rather the interest group, therefore respondents are not
blaming the favored candidate for the negative ad since they were not responsible. Despite
the differences in experimental designs, I expect the same would carry through to this
experiment.
H2: Candidates will incur less of a backlash penalty due to an interest group-
sponsored ad compared to a candidate-sponsored ad.
Since candidates will incur a smaller backlash penalty when interest groups advertise.
Therefore, that should carry through to candidate preference. Respondents should be more
likely to vote for the favored candidate from an interest group advertisement compared to
the favored candidate from a candidate-sponsored advertisement.
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H3: Interest group ads will be more persuasive than candidate-sponsored ads.
Methods
The experimental design provides a great opportunity to directly test the persua-
siveness of one type of advertisement sponsor compared to another. This design focuses
on the key aspects of the information environment in competitive elections, while also
eliminating any intervening explanations linking the television advertisements to increases
or decreases in electoral support by respondents. Importantly, by exposing all respondents
to two advertisements, the experiment allows me to directly compare how respondents
react when viewing a candidate-sponsored ad compared to an interest group ad, given that
respondents are exposed to both sides of the election. Voters do not view advertisements in
a vacuum and it is important to build that competitive environment into the experimental
design.
The experiment was conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk)
with 1,200 respondents, and each were compensated for their time with $0.50. Although the
sample is not representative of the United States, it does produce comparable results with
student samples and is increasingly common among social science researchers (Berinsky,
Huber and Lenz 2012; Mullinix et al. 2015). In particular, the sample population does
skew younger, more Democratic, and higher educated than a nationwide sample. Table
4.1 presents the demographic data from the sample compared to the 2014 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES).
Individuals were then randomized across six treatment groups listed in Table 4.2.
To ensure there were no framing or priming effects, the ordering of the advertisements
was randomized. The treatment groups were well-balanced on a range of covariates, and
the Appendix includes a full balance table. Notably, all respondents were exposed to
two advertisements. Since in competitive elections respondents typically are exposed to
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Table 4.1: Sample Demographics
Sample CCES
Democrat 44.1% 36.4%
Female 49.8% 53.2%
Age 34.0 37.4*
Non-white 22.9% 26.3%
Married 51.6% 53.8%
College Diploma 54.8% 36.9%
Voted in 2012 71.8% 76.6%
Unemployed 5.3% 6.5%
*Age was unavailable from the CCES, this value rep-
resents the median age of the U.S. based on the 2014
American Community Survey 5-year estimate.
Table 4.2: Experimental Treatment Groups
Treatment Group Democrat Republican
Treatment 1 Candidate Party
Treatment 2 Candidate Interest Group
Treatment 3 Party Interest Group
Treatment 4 Party Candidate
Treatment 5 Interest Group Party
Treatment 6 Interest Group Candidate
advertisements from both sides, this design replicates that environment. Additionally,
treatment groups where both ads were of the same sponsor were purposely excluded. While
this can provide important information on how voters respond to advertising, it does not
add explanatory power to why one sponsor may be more persuasive compared to a different
sponsor. Additionally, since interest group ads are typically negative in tone, all ads are
negative or attack ads. That way I can directly compare the effect of a negative ad by a
candidate to a negative ad by an interest group.
Respondents were initially presented with no information other than the names of
the candidates and then exposed to the television ads. After viewing both advertisements,
respondents were presented with a series of questions including my key dependent vari-
able, vote choice, as well as candidate thermometer ratings and emotional responses to the
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Figure 4.1: Main Dependent Variable: Vote Choice
advertisements. The binary vote choice question is the key variable used to determine ad
persuasiveness. The candidate thermometer ratings are used to test for advertising backlash.
After these questions respondents filled out a standard series of sociodemographic back-
ground information including: age, gender, race, income, education, and party identification.
While the respondents received no prior information about the candidates, such as
party affiliation, before viewing the advertisements, they did see each candidates’ party
affiliation when casting their vote. Candidates and interest groups rarely mention the political
party of the candidates, as such, this was excluded prior to viewing the advertisements. In
fact, of all the 2010 House advertisements, where this set of ads come from, 80.7% did
not mention any political party. However, when voters enter a ballot box they are always
presented with the political party of the candidates in House elections. As such, I replicated
that environment in the experiment by including party affiliation when respondents selected
their vote preference, as see in Figure 4.1.
In order to directly compare all six treatment groups, I employ a scaling technique
that allows for direct comparison of each of the different advertisements in the experiment.
The technique was developed by Groseclose and Stewart (1998) which allows for this
direct comparison without adding any additional assumptions than OLS regression1. Each
respondent is assigned a +1 for the advertisement they preferred and a -1 for the ad they
voted against. For the four remaining advertisements respondents are assigned zeros. These
values get regressed as a probit regression with the dependent variable taking the value of 1
1The scaling method assumes errors are independent and identically distributed, a linear ordering of ads,
and transitivity. For a more detailed description of the scaling method see Groseclose and Stewart (1998).
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Table 4.3: Example Matrix for Scaling
Democratic Ads Republican Ads
Respondent Candidate Party Interest Group Candidate Party Interest Group DV
1 -1 0 0 0 +1 0 1
2 +1 0 0 0 -1 0 1
3 0 +1 0 0 0 -1 1
4 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 1
5 0 0 -1 +1 0 0 1
in all cases. A sample of five respondents are listed below in Table 4.3.
In the example presented in Table 4.3, both the first and second respondents viewed
the candidate-sponsored ad by the Democratic candidate and the Republican party-sponsored
ad. The first respondent preferred the Republican candidate, whereas the second respondent
preferred the Democratic candidate. The third respondent preferred the Democratic party-
sponsored ad over the Republican interest group ad. Each respondent gets assigned these
values based on the ads they were exposed to and their vote choice.
I employ this scaling method twice, first examining the three main sponsors of the
advertisements - candidate, political party, and interest group. Then, I rerun the scaling
method focusing on the six sponsors, separating out by partisanship. This second scaling
allows for partisan differences whereby a Republican interest group ad may be more or less
effective than a Democratic interest group ad. Furthermore, I then focus the analysis on
comparing the candidate-sponsored ad to the interest group ads by using pairwise t-tests
instead of the scaling technique.
Experimental Stimuli
In order to use realistic stimuli in the experiment, I use House advertisements
from a past election. These are unaltered versions of the advertisements that aired on
television for and against candidates. Since all respondents have grown up with television
advertisements, they may be able to identify a realistic versus unrealistic advertisement.
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These advertisements were taken from a highly competitive election where the candidates
were fairly equally matched. I use this competitiveness as a proxy for advertisement quality.
These ads represent typical advertisements aired in congressional elections. The Appendix
includes a table of the various characteristics of these advertisements and how their attributes
are common among other advertisements.
To select a House election for the experiment, I focused on competitive House
elections. I then further narrowed down to white, male candidates. These represent the most
common type of congressional candidates, as well as reducing the potential confounds in
the experiment by eliminating race and gender as potential intervening variables.
For this experiment the television advertisements came from a 2010 House race in
Ohio’s 16th House district. The race featured the freshman Democratic House member John
Boccieri against an experienced challenger Republican Jim Renacci. Both are white male
candidates and both are experienced politicians having held previous elected office. The
political party advertisements were sponsored by the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (DCCC) and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). These
represent the two primary arms of the political parties in House races. The Democratic
interest group ad was aired by the American Worker and League of Conservation Voters,
while the Republican interest group ad was aired by Crossroads GPS. Both of these are
typical interest groups that have spent millions of dollars in various congressional elections.
Results
First I examine whether or not respondents noticed that the advertisements were
aired by interest groups instead of candidates. For each ad aired, respondents answered
two questions successively. They were first asked if the advertisement was sponsored by a
candidate or someone else in a binary choice. Then they were asked to identify the specific
sponsor from a list. Based on previous work, I expect that respondents should be able to
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Figure 4.2: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor: Binary Choice,
Three Types
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notice that the sponsor was not a candidate, but not specifically identify the exact sponsor.
Figure 4.2 presents results of the binary sponsor question for each of the three key
ad sponsors with 95% confident intervals. Respondents were able to correctly identify the
sponsor as a candidate slightly more often than when the sponsor was an interest group
or political party, and these differences do reach statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
There is no difference in the binary choice whether the ad was by a political party or an
interest group. Overall, respondents are correctly identifying the sponsor as not a candidate
more than 2/3 of the time, which is significantly higher than we would expect by pure
chance. However, this leaves a third of respondents unaware of the sponsor, and that is not a
insignificant number of voters that may influence electoral outcomes.
While respondents were almost able to correctly identify the sponsor in a binary
question, this changed dramatically when confronted with the specific sponsor. Figure 4.3
presents the results of how often respondents correctly picked the sponsor from a list of
alternatives. A notable larger gap exists. Respondents could identify the candidate as the
sponsor in 2/3 of the time, however significantly less often in the case of the political party
or interest group. In fact, respondents correctly identified the interest group sponsor in
less than 50% of the cases. This highlights how respondents are not aware of the various
sponsors advertising in congressional elections. Notably, this effect does not result from
respondents confusing the first and second ads.
Finally, I examine if there were any differences by respondents in identifying spon-
sors by partisanship. Since the sponsors were not exactly the same, it may be that respondents
were quicker to remember one party or the other. Figure 4.4 presents these results. There
are no statistical differences between between Democratic and Republican sponsors for
any of the three pairs of ads. In other words, respondents did not identify the Democratic
sponsor more often than the Republican sponsor or vice versa. The trend that was apparent
in Figure 4.3 continues in Figure 4.4, demonstrating the significantly lower percentage of
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Figure 4.3: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor, 3 Types
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Figure 4.4: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor, 6 Types
correct identifications for the interest group advertisements.
Interest Group Influence
Figure 4.5 presents the initial results comparing the sponsorship of the advertisements
by the candidate, political party, and interest group. This figure collapses both Democratic
and Republican sponsorship into a single sponsor. The y-axis indicates increasing support
for respondents who viewed that particular advertisement as one of the two ads. The interest
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Figure 4.5: Persuasiveness by 3 Types of Ads
73
group point estimate lacks a confidence interval as the scaling technique uses one of the
categories as an excluded category. This is similar to an excluded category in a regression.
Since the point estimate of the interest group ad is within the bounds of the other two types of
advertisements indicates that interest group ads are no more effective than candidate or party
sponsored advertisements. In fact, all three types of ads overlap such that ad-sponsorship
does not suggest any differences in persuasive ability. Given exposure to both candidates’
advertisements, ad sponsorship does not suggest an increased ability to persuade. However,
this may hide differences based on partisanship if Democratic and Republican ads operate
differently.
Figure 4.6 separates out the six types of advertisements based on sponsorship and
political affiliation. This figure’s y-axis represents increasing support for the Democratic
candidate. Similar to Figure 4.5, the Republican interest group ad represents the excluded
category and has no confidence interval on purpose. When a different advertisement is
used as an excluded category, it does not change the results. Both candidate-sponsored
advertisements’ confidence intervals overlap so there appears to be no difference between
their persuasive ability. However, the political party advertisements are statistically different.
The Democratic party ad increases the likelihood of a voter preferring the Democratic
candidate compared to the Republican party ad. Similar to the party ads, the Democratic
interest group ad significantly increases a respondents’ likelihood of voting Democratic,
whereas the Republican interest group ad increases their odds of voting Republican.
Taken together, all three types of Democratic sponsored ads yield similar levels
of persuasiveness. None of the Democratic sponsors is significantly different than the
others. While among Republican advertisements, the candidate and party-sponsored ads
also yield no statistical different. However, the Republican interest group ad does appear
to be significantly more persuasive compared to either the candidate or party-sponsored
advertisements. In fact, all three Democratic-sponsored ads and two of the Republican
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Figure 4.6: Persuasiveness by 6 Types of Ads
75
Table 4.4: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Sponsor
Sample
Treatment Republican Vote P-value
Candidate (R) vs 32.5%
Party (D) 0.41
Interest Group (R) vs 28.7%
Party (D)
Candidate (D) vs 36.0%
Party (R) 0.36
Interest Group (D) vs 31.7%
Party (R)
sponsored ads do not yield differences that are statistically significant. As a whole, given
exposure to both candidates, this result highlights the limited benefits of ad-sponsorship on
the persuasiveness of advertising.
While the political party advertisements provide an intermediate stimulus, most
advertisements are either candidates or interest groups. Additionally, since Citizens United
questions have arisen about the relative influence of interest groups on elections. To focus on
this relationship, I conducted pairwise t-tests between the candidate-sponsored and interest
group-sponsored treatment groups. Table 4.4 presents this first test using the binary vote
choice. In line with the previous results in Figures 4.5, 4.6 interest group ads were not
statistically significantly more persuasive compared to candidate-sponsored advertisements.
This result holds for both Democrats and Republicans.
It may be that respondents preferences may not change, yet their perceptions of
the candidates may still change based on the sponsor of the advertisement. While, it may
take more than one or two ads to change a vote choice, smaller changes may be seen on
a 100-point thermometer rating. Due to the sample size, the binary vote choice can only
detect a 10% shift in preferences, while the thermometer ratings can catch a 5-point shift.
Table 4.5 tests whether or not there was backlash against the sponsor of the advertisement.
Interestingly, the Republican candidate suffered backlash when the interest group aired a
negative ad instead of sponsoring his own negative ad. In contrast, there were no statistical
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Table 4.5: Testing Backlash: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Sponsor
Sample
Treatment Rating P-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Candidate (R) vs 40.5%
Party (D) <0.01
Interest Group (R) vs 30.4%
Party (D)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Candidate (D) vs 49.5%
Party (R) 0.48
Interest Group (D) vs 47.8%
Party (R)
differences for the Democratic candidate, meaning there was no increase in backlash when
the democratic interest group aired an attack instead of the candidate.
Similarly, I can assess whether an interest group advertisement had a greater impact
on the target of the advertisement. In other words, did the opposition candidate’s rating
change as a result of the negative ad; this is the intended effect of the sponsor. Table 4.6
presents these results with the interest group ad being more impactful than the candidate-
sponsored ad in both cases. The Democratic interest group ad lowered the rating of the
Republican candidate significantly more compared to a candidate-sponsored advertise-
ment. Similarly, the Republican interest group ad was more effective than the Republican
candidate’s advertisement.
Combining the results from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 demonstrate the different effect
interest group advertisements may yield compared to candidate-sponsored advertisements.
Interest group ads can significantly lower the ratings of the candidates they oppose. While at
the same time, they may or may not incur a penalty for their favored candidate. This provides
mixed support if interest groups can in fact do the dirty work on behalf of candidates. In
this context interest group negative ads were able to attack without consequence for the
Democratic but not Republican candidate.
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Table 4.6: Effect on Target: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Sponsor
Sample
Treatment Rating P-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Candidate (D) vs 41.2%
Party (R) <0.01
Interest Group (D) vs 34.5%
Party (R)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Candidate (R) vs 47.4%
Party (D) 0.08
Interest Group (R) vs 42.7%
Party (D)
Conclusion
The analysis supports my hypotheses that individuals do notice when interest groups
advertise instead of candidates. However, individuals often do not recall who was the
specific interest group that sponsored the advertisement. Additionally, since respondents
understand that candidates are not responsible for these ads, respondents attribute less
backlash towards them when viewing a negative ad by an interest group. However, despite
these differences, respondents remain equally persuaded by an interest group ad compared
to a candidate-sponsored advertisement.
The experimental design represents a key advancement as it more closely simulates
the competitive electoral environment by exposing respondents to two ads - one Democratic
and one Republican. Experiments can often find a single advertisement influences individ-
uals, however in competitive elections both candidates advertise heavily. It is essential to
account for this in the design itself. This moderates the effect of any single advertisement but
represents a more realistic test of advertising as most voters are exposed to both candidates’
ads over the course of the election. Given that respondents viewed two ads, the results
demonstrate how they found interest group and candidate-sponsored ads equally persuasive.
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These results add to the literature that test the role these interest group advertisements
are having on our electoral results. In particular, this adds to our understanding of how
interest groups may be able to persuade voters. This becomes particularly relevant when
in recent elections interest groups are advertising just as much or more than candidates in
certain congressional races. As such the winner or loser of the election may be more due to
these interest groups than actual candidates’ campaigns.
Based upon these findings, candidates ought to decrease their use of negative ad-
vertisements. Instead, they should rely upon outside groups to do air the attack ads on
their behalf. This would decrease the backlash against the candidate while maintaining
the attacks on an opponent. Previous work highlights mixed findings if negative ads are
more persuasive than positive ads (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007), however this research
focuses primarily on candidate-sponsored ads. Candidates may increase their chances of
winning by outsourcing their attacks to interest groups thereby decreasing their level of
backlash.
Future research would benefit from including more than two advertisements in the
experimental design, since over the course of a congressional campaign, voters will be
exposed to hundreds of ads. Additionally, an alternative explanation may be that advertising
yields an additive effect. Since respondents did alter their thermometer ratings of the
candidates, it may be that more advertising exposure would eventually equate to a change
in vote choice. However, given our highly polarized politics, it may be that views of the
candidates change but ultimately vote choice may not change due to stronger factors, notably
party identification. Further research is necessary in order to discern which of these may
hold true.
Interest groups are the least representative aspect of our democracy. Although many
types of groups may be represented by lobbying firms in Washington, only a select few
have extensive funds to expend in elections. In a post-Citizens United environment, interest
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groups have gained significant power to influence elections, and especially air negative
advertisements without the negative repercussion of backlash that is normally associated
with negative ads. Without the backlash effect, interest groups can air attacks against a
candidate without harming their preferred candidate. Although it has been demonstrated
that interest groups wield influence in Washington, this represents a huge leap in their power
to now influence who gets elected, and is troubling for our democracy.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The three separate analyses combined illustrate the role television advertising plays
in U.S. House elections. The results highlight how advertising’s influence is significantly
less than conventional wisdom might dictate. Across all three analyses advertising’s impact
is relatively small and may only influence electoral results that are extremely close. In
particular, my results demonstrate how the previous focus on advertising tone does not
appear to be the most relevant characteristic of advertising that influences vote choice.
Additionally, the sponsor of the ad also appears to yield little effect on an individuals’ vote
choice. Taken together these results demonstrate how factors other than tone and sponsorship
need to be tested to fully assess when and how advertising persuades.
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate the relationship between advertising tone and electoral
success in competitive U.S. House elections from 2000-2012. My results highlight that
candidates match each other’s strategies, and as a result air approximately the same number
of positive, negative, and contrast ads in each week of the campaign. Since both candidates
air the same ads, it follows that advertising yields little effect on a candidate’s vote share. In
fact, the only statistically significant effect arises from a backlash penalty against Republican
candidates for airing negative advertisements.
In low information elections, voters have a limited amount of information about
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the candidates. Advertising does serve as an important source of information to voters,
especially less politically interested voters. However, in these and other low information
elections, advertising continues to lag behind presidential or senate elections. As a result,
advertising may not have as wide a reach as it does in high profile, top of the ballot elections.
The Chapter 2 results remain correlational, and so Chapter 3 builds on that analysis
and uses an experiment in order to test the causal relationship between advertising tone and
vote choice. The survey experiment improves on previous designs in two key ways, the first
by exposing all respondents to two advertisements, one from each candidate. This more
closely approximates the advertising environment where individuals will be exposed to both
candidates at some point during a campaign. Additionally, the advertising stimuli were past
congressional ads, in order to represent realistic stimuli for the respondents. Combining
these two aspects provides the experiment a closer approximation of how voters might
respond to advertising during a campaign.
The survey experiment was conducted three times in order to demonstrate consistency
across two different samples and two different sets of ads. The results demonstrate consistent
results, highlighting how positive, negative, and contrast ads yield no differential impact on
vote choice. This supports the results presented in Chapter 2 that advertising tone does not
cause a substantial change in electoral outcomes. Upon further investigation, negative ads do
cause a backlash penalty against the sponsor of the ad. However, none of the ads consistently
caused any intended effect against their opponent. While negative advertisements may have
a small persuasive effect, it is only through a backlash penalty. This has serious implications
for how we view advertising effects and how advertising should be employed during a
campaign.
Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the limited benefits of advertising
in U.S. House elections. Given the results, they highlight how negative ads in these low
information elections may be particularly harmful and candidates may benefit by engaging
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in more positive advertising. Since many individuals deride the use of negative advertising,
the evidence presented here suggests that in low information elections, it would be advised
to not engage in negative advertising. Additionally, the best reason to advertise is simply
to counteract an opponent’s advertising, which only serves to further the arms race of
advertising with higher and higher levels of spending.
These results demonstrate how advertising tone may not be important in determining
which television ads are most persuasive. However, it may be that a different characteristic
of an ad is more influential in determining vote choice. Due to these results I then examined
if advertising sponsorship may influence an individual’s propensity to vote for a particular
candidate. Chapter 4 tests whether a negative ad by a candidate is more or less persuasive
compared to a negative ad sponsored by an interest group. These results highlight how
advertising sponsorship does not influence the persuasiveness of an ad. Candidate, political
party, and interest group ads were equally persuasive in the survey experiment.
Increasingly interest groups are advertising in elections and spending millions of
dollars to persuade voters for or against a candidate. This represents a new phenomena
that has quickly developed since the 2010 Citizens United ruling. These results provide
initial evidence how voters do not notice the difference between an interest group and
candidate-sponsored advertisement. This provides troubling evidence that interest groups
may wield power in influencing electoral outcomes, especially as groups have been spending
as much as candidates in certain hyper-competitive districts.
Importantly, these results provide two clear results. First, advertising tone is not
the relevant advertising characteristic that drives persuasion. As a result more studies are
necessary to determine what other factors drive ads to persuade voters. It may be that the
particular policy issues discussed, use of a narrator, particular images, or other characteristic
causes persuasion more than advertising tone. Secondly, if advertising does yield an effect,
than interest groups ads are equally persuasive compared to candidates’ ads. This means
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that interest groups can influence elections to the same extent as the candidates themselves.
This result raises serious questions about the role of interest groups in our democracy and
how involved they should be in determining who wins and loses elections.
Future research is necessary to fully examine these and other issues to better under-
stand the relationship between advertising and electoral results. In particular, the next steps
would be to examine the relationship between policy issues mentioned in advertisements and
their persuasiveness with voters. Another important avenue for research will be targeted and
micro-targeted advertising. While we know that advertisements are increasingly targeted
towards their audience, no work has demonstrated that those audiences respond more to
the targeted ads compared to a non-target audience. Finally, it is highly disconcerting
that powerful interest groups may be influencing our elections equally or more than the
candidates, and further work is necessary to examine how much influence interest groups
are wielding in our elections.
These results have serious public policy implications, if television advertising does
persuade then interest group advertising is just as effective as candidate advertising, which
is a troubling issue for our democracy. Since voters do not notice when they see an interest
group ad compared to a candidate ad, it becomes essential to legislate or regulate these
advertisements. Policymakers should take action in order to limit the amount of influence of
interest groups in elections. A simple solution may be to force a larger and more obvious
disclaimer in each advertisement about the sponsor of the ad. Today most sponsors are
listed in small print and quickly voiced at the end of an advertisement. Alternatively, if the
disclaimer needed to be larger and more prominent than that may help reduce some of the
effects of interest group advertising, but it will definitely not solve the entire problem. To
completely limit the power of interest groups, then at least part of Citizens United needs to
be overturned, such that groups can no longer advocate for or against candidates, as under
the pre-2010 regulations. Interest groups are the least representative part of our democracy
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and they should not wield this level of control in our elections.
Alternatively, if advertising does not persuade as two of my analyses suggest, then
we may be less concerned with interest group influence. Despite, advertising’s limited
ability to persuade voters, these results do not support banning television advertising. While
the primary purpose of advertising may be to persuade, lots of evidence exists of its benefit
in increasing voter knowledge and turnout. However, these results do provide evidence
against the use of negative advertising. My results suggest that if candidates did not engage
in negative advertising, the result of the election would not change, but feelings towards the
candidates would be significantly higher. This suggests that without negative advertising we
would have higher levels of faith and trust in our elected leaders. Since today’s politics are
defined by extreme polarization of the two parties, politics would benefit from more civility
and less decisiveness.
These results also illustrate how the primary purpose of television advertising is
to cancel out your opponent’s advertising. In the end, if advertising does not persuade,
then this may be due to both candidates in competitive elections advertising identically.
As a result, any competitive candidate should be airing as many advertisements as their
opponents. But, in order to actually win the election, then their campaign needs to engage
in other activities that may actually determine the result, such as get-out-the-vote efforts.
While television advertising may represent the largest campaign expenditure, it may not be
the most influential in determining who ultimately wins the election.
Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendix: Aggregate
Analysis
Table A1 is a table of means for the variables used in the analysis. It then goes on
to include the primary OLS regression tables included in the paper. Table A2 presents the
overall advertising effects including all control variables, with Table A3 examining total
advertising effects over different time frames of aggregation. Table A4 presents the main
analysis including the effects for all control variables. Table A5 replicates the main table
from the text, including the effects for all control variables.
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Table A1: Table of Means
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Dem Vote Share 165 49.90 3.12 50.20 45.00 55.00
Incumbent 165 0.01 0.87 0.00 -1.00 1.00
Dem Incumbent 165 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rep Incumbent 165 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dem Expenses (logged) 165 14.41 0.52 14.49 12.71 15.47
Rep Expenses (logged) 164 14.30 0.71 14.29 11.60 17.06
Freshman 165 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dem Winner 165 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00
Challenger Experience 165 0.53 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00
Contrast (D) 165 15.98 19.24 10.90 0.00 92.50
Positive (D) 165 11.61 15.87 4.80 0.00 72.50
Negative (D) 165 8.53 14.88 0.00 0.00 95.70
Contrast (R) 165 10.21 13.93 2.20 0.00 72.40
Positive (R) 165 9.90 15.23 0.60 0.00 86.40
Negative (R) 165 12.82 22.84 0.00 0.00 145.20
Non-Cand Ads (D) 165 33.37 34.09 27.30 0.00 140.90
Non-Cand Ads (R) 165 31.63 34.14 27.00 0.00 177.80
Total Ads 165 69.05 45.35 64.30 0.00 226.30
Total Ads (D) 165 36.12 26.34 34.70 0.00 168.20
Total Ads (R) 165 32.93 29.32 28.70 0.00 171.10
Dem Pres Vote Share 165 51.12 7.04 51.50 31.01 71.40
Ads are in 10s.
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Table A2: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 49.93∗∗∗ 49.76∗∗∗ 37.44∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.67) (6.97)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.00
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.00
(0.01)
Incumbent 1.31∗∗∗
(0.27)
Freshman −0.18
(0.43)
Challenger Experience 0.18
(0.39)
Dem Expenses 1.40∗∗
(0.46)
Rep Expenses −1.25∗∗
(0.41)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.05 0.06 0.42
Adj. R2 0.03 0.01 0.36
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads
are in 10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media
market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A3: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share in Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 37.06∗∗∗ 37.15∗∗∗ 37.44∗∗∗ 40.59∗∗∗ 40.57∗∗∗ 39.49∗∗∗
(7.06) (6.96) (6.97) (7.19) (7.07) (7.24)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Incumbent 1.27∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Freshman −0.19 −0.19 −0.18 −0.30 −0.30 −0.30
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Challenger Experience 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.31 0.32 0.35
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
Dem Expenses 1.32∗∗ 1.46∗∗ 1.40∗∗ 1.34∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 1.45∗∗
(0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Rep Expenses −1.16∗∗ −1.28∗∗ −1.25∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.41
Adj. R2 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.35
Num. obs. 169 164 164 162 162 160
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A4: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone in Competitive Districts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.08∗∗∗ 49.97∗∗∗ 39.83∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.68) (6.77)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Positive 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative 0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Positive −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.00
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.00
(0.01)
Incumbent 1.21∗∗∗
(0.27)
Freshman −0.36
(0.42)
Challenger Experience 0.17
(0.38)
Dem Expenses 1.29∗∗
(0.46)
Rep Expenses −1.29∗∗
(0.39)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.13 0.45
Adj. R2 0.09 0.07 0.38
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads
are in 10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media
market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A5: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Cumulative Days to Election in
Competitive Elections
8 Weeks 3 Weeks 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Days 1 Day
Intercept 40.15∗∗∗ 40.13∗∗∗ 39.83∗∗∗ 41.31∗∗∗ 41.00∗∗∗ 39.74∗∗∗
(6.54) (6.72) (6.77) (6.71) (6.69) (6.93)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Positive 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Negative −0.01∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.08 −0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Positive −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 −0.03 −0.07 −0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Negative 0.01∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.04∗ 0.09∗ 0.13∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Incumbent 1.06∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Freshman −0.35 −0.30 −0.36 −0.46 −0.44 −0.43
(0.38) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Challenger Experience 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.38
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Dem Expenses 1.12∗ 1.34∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 1.25∗∗ 1.36∗∗
(0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
Rep Expenses −1.15∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −1.29∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45
Adj. R2 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.38
Num. obs. 169 164 164 162 162 160
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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I replicate the main analysis here but include all congressional districts where a
candidate aired at least a single advertisement, approximately 705 districts. These only
represent the single-media market districts, just like the main analyses presented in the paper.
Table A6 presents a table of means. Tables A7-A8 replicates Tables A2-A3 examining the
total advertising effects. Then Tables A9-A11 presents the same analysis from Appendix A
but including the uncompetitive districts.
Table A6: Table of Means, All Single Media-Market Districts
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Dem Vote Share 705 48.92 13.11 47.29 15.20 87.59
Incumbent 729 -0.07 0.90 0.00 -1.00 1.00
Dem Incumbent 729 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rep Incumbent 729 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dem Expenses (logged) 701 13.29 1.79 13.80 0.00 15.81
Rep Expenses (logged) 714 13.48 1.74 13.90 0.00 17.06
Freshman 729 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dem Winner 729 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Challenger Experience 729 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Contrast (D) 729 7.02 14.63 0.00 0.00 112.00
Positive (D) 729 9.47 14.88 0.50 0.00 89.50
Negative (D) 729 4.11 10.89 0.00 0.00 95.70
Contrast (R) 729 4.94 11.09 0.00 0.00 77.20
Positive (R) 729 8.51 12.66 1.30 0.00 89.50
Negative (R) 729 5.84 15.34 0.00 0.00 145.20
Non-Cand Ads (D) 729 11.14 24.04 0.00 0.00 140.90
Non-Cand Ads (R) 729 10.36 23.11 0.00 0.00 177.80
Total Ads 729 39.89 40.36 27.00 0.00 226.30
Total Ads (D) 729 20.60 24.11 11.80 0.00 168.20
Total Ads (R) 729 19.29 23.20 11.30 0.00 171.10
Dem Pres Vote Share 729 50.01 10.63 49.13 23.47 90.00
Ads are in 10s.
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Table A7: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 48.42∗∗∗ 48.16∗∗∗ 22.80∗∗∗
(0.65) (1.21) (3.99)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads −0.19∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.03∗∗
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.03∗∗
(0.01)
Incumbent 4.97∗∗∗
(0.34)
Freshman −0.32
(0.48)
Challenger Experience −0.26
(0.43)
Dem Expenses 1.46∗∗∗
(0.24)
Rep Expenses −1.57∗∗∗
(0.23)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.58∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.14 0.15 0.85
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.85
Num. obs. 705 705 684
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are in
10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media market.
Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A8: Total Advertising Effect on Democratic Vote Share by Weeks Aggregated
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 22.39∗∗∗ 22.46∗∗∗ 22.80∗∗∗ 23.32∗∗∗ 21.54∗∗∗ 21.49∗∗∗
(3.90) (3.98) (3.99) (4.06) (4.57) (4.56)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads 0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Total Ads −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 −0.04 −0.06
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.09 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗ −0.09 −0.10
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Incumbent 5.21∗∗∗ 5.03∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 5.07∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36)
Freshman −0.31 −0.33 −0.32 −0.36 −0.46 −0.46
(0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Challenger Experience −0.11 −0.20 −0.26 −0.29 −0.34 −0.32
(0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Dem Expenses 1.52∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32) (0.32)
Rep Expenses −1.58∗∗∗ −1.56∗∗∗ −1.57∗∗∗ −1.57∗∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ −1.62∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84
Adj. R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
Num. obs. 720 688 684 670 656 649
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A9: Binary OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone for All Ad Data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 48.90∗∗∗ 45.96∗∗∗ 48.90∗∗∗ 48.91∗∗∗ 51.80∗∗∗ 48.90∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.54) (0.56) (0.53)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.00
(0.00)
Positive 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00)
Negative 0.00
(0.00)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.00
(0.00)
Positive −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00)
Negative 0.00
(0.00)
R2 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
Adj. R2 -0.00 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
Num. obs. 705 705 705 705 705 705
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s.
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Table A10: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Ad Tone, All Ad Data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 48.79∗∗∗ 48.54∗∗∗ 23.20∗∗∗
(0.66) (1.21) (3.98)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.08∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Positive 0.30∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Negative 0.00 0.01 −0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.09∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Positive −0.32∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Negative −0.03 −0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.03∗
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.03∗
(0.01)
Incumbent 4.83∗∗∗
(0.35)
Freshman −0.37
(0.47)
Challenger Experience −0.27
(0.43)
Dem Expenses 1.45∗∗∗
(0.24)
Rep Expenses −1.54∗∗∗
(0.22)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.23 0.85
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.85
Num. obs. 705 705 684
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are in
10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media market.
Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A11: OLS Regression of Democratic Vote Share by Cumulative Days to Election,
All Advertising Data
8 Weeks 3 Weeks 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Days 1 Day
Intercept 22.79∗∗∗ 22.89∗∗∗ 23.20∗∗∗ 23.19∗∗∗ 21.48∗∗∗ 21.38∗∗∗
(3.87) (3.96) (3.98) (4.05) (4.59) (4.58)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Positive 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.13 0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
Negative −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.07 −0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.09 −0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.10)
Positive −0.03∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.15 −0.19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11)
Negative 0.01∗ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.01∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.04 −0.09 −0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Incumbent 5.08∗∗∗ 4.85∗∗∗ 4.83∗∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Freshman −0.41 −0.38 −0.37 −0.44 −0.51 −0.50
(0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Challenger Experience −0.11 −0.19 −0.27 −0.31 −0.35 −0.32
(0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
Dem Expenses 1.51∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32) (0.32)
Rep Expenses −1.57∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ −1.53∗∗∗ −1.60∗∗∗ −1.59∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84
Adj. R2 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84
Num. obs. 720 688 684 670 656 649
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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I included three different variations on the main analysis here. First, Table A12
estimates a non-linear ad effect by taking the natural log of the number of ads. This result
highlights the diminishing returns to advertising, which reflects similar findings in campaign
expenditures. Table A13 estimates a non-linear effect using the squared number of each
type of ad. Finally Table A14 uses the proportion of each type of ad, instead of the number
of ads. Contrast ads are the excluded category.
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Table A12: OLS Regression of Natural Log of Number of Ads, Competitive Districts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.06∗∗∗ 49.93∗∗∗ 38.30∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.83) (6.92)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Log Contrast −0.00 0.00 0.10
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15)
Log Positive 0.46∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.14
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Log Negative 0.21 0.22 0.19
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Log Contrast −0.18 −0.17 −0.20
(0.17) (0.16) (0.14)
Log Positive −0.52∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.32∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
Log Negative −0.11 −0.12 −0.02
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.01
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.00
(0.01)
Incumbent 1.20∗∗∗
(0.28)
Freshman −0.27
(0.42)
Challenger Experience 0.19
(0.39)
Dem Expenses 1.15∗
(0.44)
Rep Expenses −1.06∗∗
(0.39)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year FE No Yes Yes
R2 0.13 0.14 0.45
Adj. R2 0.09 0.07 0.37
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads
are in natural logs. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district
and media market. Expenses are in natural logs
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Table A13: OLS Regression of Ad Tone, with Squared Ad Totals, Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.17∗∗∗ 50.14∗∗∗ 40.84∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.81) (6.81)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Sq. Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sq. Positive −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sq. Negative −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contrast 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Positive 0.06 0.06 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Negative 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Sq. Contrast 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sq. Positive 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sq. Negative 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contrast −0.04 −0.05 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Positive −0.10∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.07∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Negative −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.00
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00
(0.01)
Incumbent 1.11∗∗∗
(0.27)
Freshman −0.45
(0.40)
Challenger Experience 0.26
(0.38)
Dem Expenses 1.02∗
(0.45)
Rep Expenses −1.15∗∗
(0.40)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.22∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year FE No Yes Yes
R2 0.15 0.16 0.48
Adj. R2 0.09 0.06 0.39
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads
are in 10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on district and media market.
Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A14: OLS Regression of Proportion of Ads, Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 49.55∗∗∗ 49.38∗∗∗ 38.89∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.73) (6.66)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Prop. Positive 21.56∗∗ 21.32∗∗ 6.44
(7.00) (7.58) (6.64)
Prop. Negative 3.13 1.94 −2.52
(8.10) (8.17) (6.63)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Prop. Positive −16.26∗ −14.98∗ −8.63
(7.40) (7.54) (5.72)
Prop. Negative 1.42 1.89 8.48
(6.50) (6.11) (5.24)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.00
(0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.00
(0.01)
Incumbent 1.21∗∗∗
(0.28)
Freshman −0.30
(0.43)
Challenger Experience 0.17
(0.40)
Dem Expenses 1.42∗∗
(0.45)
Rep Expenses −1.36∗∗∗
(0.39)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year FE No Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.10 0.44
Adj. R2 0.06 0.04 0.37
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are
in proportions, contrast ads are excluded category. When a candidate aired zero ads,
the proportion was set as zero. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional
district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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I then include here a range of other model specifications. Table A15 replicates
the main analysis in Table 2, examining advertising effect with different time frames of
aggregation, except using a logit regression. The dependent variable in these regressions is
if the winner of the election was the Democratic candidate. Table A16 replicates the primary
analysis using OLS regression, but includes multi-media market congressional districts.
The effect is not directly interpretable since not all voters were exposed to the same set of
advertisements. Table A17 replicates the main analysis but weights the advertisements by
their cost; this over-weights large metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles. Table A18 takes
the natural log of these weighted ad totals and estimates the non-linear effect. Finally table
A19 uses the weighted advertisement totals for multi-media market districts.
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Table A15: Logit Regression of Democratic Winner by Ad Tone in Competitive Elections
8 Weeks 3 Weeks 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Days 1 Day
Intercept −17.58∗ −17.73∗ −17.03∗ −14.16 −14.55 −15.44∗
(7.22) (7.53) (7.66) (7.32) (7.48) (7.71)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Positive 0.02∗∗ 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11)
Negative −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.06 −0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.09 −0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Positive −0.01 −0.02 −0.03∗ −0.05 −0.11 −0.13
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
Negative 0.01∗ 0.02 0.02 0.05∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Incumbent 1.04∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.31) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34)
Freshman 0.11 0.03 0.00 −0.03 0.04 0.02
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Challenger Experience 0.49 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.73 0.77
(0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
Dem Expenses 1.38∗ 1.55∗ 1.41∗ 1.24∗ 1.37∗ 1.48∗
(0.60) (0.61) (0.64) (0.63) (0.65) (0.65)
Rep Expenses −0.75 −0.83 −0.78 −0.95 −1.01∗ −1.05∗
(0.42) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -76.08 -77.43 -75.66 -70.15 -69.89 -70.56
Num. obs. 169 164 164 162 162 160
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Ads are in 10s. Errors are clustered on district and media market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A16: OLS Regression of Advertising Tone, Multi-Media Market Districts,
Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.61∗∗∗ 50.45∗∗∗ 42.60∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.54) (5.60)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Positive 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Positive −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative −0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Non-Cand Ads (D) 0.00
(0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (R) −0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent 1.25∗∗∗
(0.23)
Freshman 0.10
(0.33)
Challenger Experience 0.33
(0.30)
Dem Expenses 1.11∗∗
(0.34)
Rep Expenses −1.26∗∗∗
(0.32)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.18∗∗∗
(0.02)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.10 0.12 0.40
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.35
Num. obs. 266 266 263
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are
in 10s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district. Expenses are in
natural logs.
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Table A17: OLS Regression by Ad Tone, Weighted by Cost, Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 49.88∗∗∗ 49.61∗∗∗ 35.94∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.73) (6.46)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Positive 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Negative 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Positive −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Negative 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00
(0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent 1.36∗∗∗
(0.27)
Freshman −0.46
(0.43)
Challenger Experience 0.33
(0.37)
Dem Expenses 1.53∗∗∗
(0.44)
Rep Expenses −1.23∗∗
(0.37)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.09 0.47
Adj. R2 0.05 0.02 0.40
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are
in 1000s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media
market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A18: OLS Regression by Logged Ad Tone, Weighted by Cost, Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 50.29∗∗∗ 50.18∗∗∗ 36.05∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.92) (6.86)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Log Contrast −0.03 −0.03 0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Log Positive 0.24∗ 0.22∗ −0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Log Negative 0.14 0.14 0.11
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Log Contrast −0.12 −0.12 −0.16
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Log Positive −0.34∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.23∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Log Negative −0.05 −0.05 −0.00
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00
(0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent 1.29∗∗∗
(0.28)
Freshman −0.37
(0.43)
Challenger Experience 0.34
(0.38)
Dem Expenses 1.26∗∗
(0.43)
Rep Expenses −0.95∗
(0.37)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.13 0.46
Adj. R2 0.09 0.07 0.39
Num. obs. 165 165 164
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are in
natural logs. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media
market. Expenses are in natural logs.
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Table A19: OLS Regression by Advertising Tone, Multi-Media Market Districts,
Weighted by Cost, Competitive Elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 49.90∗∗∗ 49.82∗∗∗ 41.42∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.62) (5.77)
Democrat Candidate’s Ads
Contrast 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Positive 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Negative 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Republican Candidate’s Ads
Contrast −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Positive −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Negative 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (D) −0.00
(0.00)
Non-Cand Ads (R) 0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent 1.31∗∗∗
(0.23)
Freshman −0.01
(0.35)
Challenger Experience 0.35
(0.29)
Dem Expenses 1.14∗∗
(0.36)
Rep Expenses −1.21∗∗∗
(0.32)
Dem Pres Vote Share 0.19∗∗∗
(0.02)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.07 0.08 0.40
Adj. R2 0.05 0.04 0.36
Num. obs. 266 266 263
∗∗∗p< 0.001, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗p< 0.05
Table includes all advertisements aired in final two weeks of the campaign. Ads are in
1000s. Last 2 columns errors are clustered on congressional district and media market.
Expenses are in natural logs.
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I present here additional evidence and alternative specifications demonstrating how
both candidates in a competitive House election advertise similarly. Table A20 replicates
Table 2.5 in the main analysis but instead of number of ads, uses proportion of ads. The
results do not change, that both candidates advertise similarly in competitive elections.
Figure A.1 presents the choice of advertising tone for candidates in all House elections,
including both competitive and uncompetitive races. Figure A.2 subsets this data to focus
solely on uncompetitive races. Unlike in competitive races where both candidates advertise
similarly, in uncompetitive races candidates advertise significantly different number of
positive advertisements. Both candidates air approximately the same number of negative
and contrast ads.
Instead of examining the winning and losing candidates, I replicate the analysis
examining Democratic and Republican candidates. While some differences exist between
Democrats and Republicans, these differences disappear when adding in control variables, as
seen in the main analysis. Figure A.3 presents the choice of advertising tone by Democratic
and Republican candidates in all elections, Figure A.4 focuses on competitive elections,
and Figure A.5 only on uncompetitive elections. Across all analyses I define competitive
as candidates within 10% of each other, all others are considered uncompetitive. Table
A21 focuses on the relationship presented in Figure A.4 and replicates the Table 2.5 but
by partisanship instead of winning and losing candidates. Table A22 then presents the
proportion of advertisements by partisanship, replicating Table A20.
Table A20: Aggregate Proportion of Ads in Competitive Elections
Weeks Positive Ads (%) Negative Ads (%)
To Election Winners Losers p Winners Losers p
5 24.74 35.74 0.08 27.57 22.03 0.34
4 24.27 25.30 0.85 25.48 29.31 0.50
3 22.81 23.52 0.89 26.03 35.18 0.09
2 21.17 22.18 0.82 30.68 35.87 0.35
1 27.38 24.69 0.58 22.09 34.11 0.02
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Figure A.1: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in All Elections
Table A21: Aggregate Number of Ads in Competitive Elections by Partisanship
Weeks Positive Ads Negative Ads Contrast Ads
To Election Dems Reps p Dems Reps p Dems Reps p
5 58.09 36.84 0.02 58.81 38.49 0.03 62.34 32.25 < 0.01
4 63.97 41.50 0.02 66.29 49.75 0.09 69.90 42.74 < 0.01
3 61.99 41.33 0.02 73.64 69.42 0.70 84.96 43.69 < 0.01
2 65.19 43.59 < 0.01 70.48 79.94 0.42 110.89 62.03 < 0.01
1 90.71 52.37 < 0.01 57.01 92.34 < 0.01 124.95 89.14 < 0.01
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Figure A.2: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Uncompetitive Elections
Table A22: Aggregate Proportion of Ads in Competitive Elections by Partisanship
Weeks Positive Ads (%) Negative Ads (%)
To Election Dems Reps p Dems Reps p
5 32.03 29.01 0.45 23.54 30.48 0.10
4 31.11 25.56 0.13 26.36 34.99 0.03
3 27.38 25.61 0.60 26.14 39.71 < 0.01
2 25.80 22.27 0.24 23.66 36.61 < 0.01
1 31.80 22.46 < 0.01 17.42 34.08 < 0.01
110
Weeks Until Election
N
um
be
r o
f A
ds
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0 Democrats
Positive
Contrast
Negative
Republicans
Positive
Contrast
Negative
Figure A.3: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in All Elections by Partisanship
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Figure A.4: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Competitive Elections by Partisanship
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Figure A.5: Number of Ads Over the Campaign in Uncompetitive Elections by
Partisanship
Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix: Experimental
Analysis
Appendix Table B1 provides the raw support for the Republican candidate across all
the treatment groups, for all three samples. Table B2 presents the balance table of covariates
for MTurk Sample 1, similar tables for the CCES and MTurk Sample 2 are B3 and B4
respectively. Table B5 provides a comparison of these covariates between the three sample
populations.
Table B1: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups
Treatment Group MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Pos (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 41.6% 41.9% 24.6%
Neg (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 37.1% 55.5% 37.4%
Con (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 31.5% 45.8% 38.2%
Pos (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 31.1% 51.3% 25.7%
Con (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 27.0% 43.8% 35.1%
Neg (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 30.8% 47.5% 29.4%
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Table B2: Balance Table of Covariates, MTurk Sample 1
Treat. 1 Treat. 2 Treat. 3 Treat. 4 Treat. 5 Treat. 6
Democrat 45.2% 38.1% 46.6% 38.2% 43.1% 45.0%
Female 34.3% 39.3% 40.5% 39.4% 41.9% 33.9%
Age 33.2 32.5 32.6 33.2 31.0 32.7
Non-white 20.5% 25.6% 25.8% 24.2% 19.2% 22.2%
Married 39.2% 39.3% 42.7% 46.1% 44.3% 37.4%
College Diploma 49.4% 50.1% 44.4% 52.7% 44.9% 52.6%
Voted in 2012 66.9% 69.6% 69.1% 73.3% 74.3% 73.7%
Unemployed 10.2% 10.7% 10.7% 14.6% 8.4% 10.5%
Table B3: Balance Table of Covariates, CCES Sample
Treat. 1 Treat. 2 Treat. 3 Treat. 4 Treat. 5 Treat. 6
Democrat 26% 34.8% 35.7% 31.1% 31.8% 29.8%
Female 52% 53.6% 51.8% 46.3% 48.4% 55.7%
Age 49.7 51.4 52.7 51.8 50.8 48.4
Non-white 30.7% 25.9% 16.1% 24.4% 19.8% 20.2%
Married 50% 45.5% 49.7% 50% 57.9% 59.7%
College Diploma 40.7% 36.6% 33.6% 39.6% 42.1% 43.6%
Voted in 2012 76.7% 76.8% 76.9% 81.7% 76.2% 77.4%
Table B4: Balance Table of Covariates, MTurk Sample 2
Treat. 1 Treat. 2 Treat. 3 Treat. 4 Treat. 5 Treat. 6
Democrat 41.4% 42.7% 41.0% 45.2% 44.0% 40.0%
Female 47.0% 41.7% 46.3% 52.4% 43.5% 50.2%
Age 30.9 32.2 31.7 33.7 32.6 33.7
Non-white 25.3% 24.0% 26.3% 26.2% 23.4% 25.9%
Married 34.9% 42.2% 43.9% 46.1% 47.9% 49.3%
College Diploma 42.9% 50.5% 50.2% 44.2% 52.6% 40.5%
Voted in 2012 66.2% 66.2% 70.2% 66.5% 71.3% 72.7%
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Table B5: Table of Covariate Comparison
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Democrat 42.8% 31.4% 42.8%
Female 38.2% 51% 46.9%
Age 32.5 50.9 32.8
Non-white 23.0% 23% 24.3%
Married 41.5% 52% 45.2%
College Diploma 49.1% 39.3% 48.1%
Voted in 2012 71.1% 77.8% 69.8%
Unemployed 10.8% 7.3% 7.2%
Then I examine the representativeness of the two sets of advertisements, from
Michigan’s 7th Congressional District in 2008 and Virginia’s 2nd Congressional District in
2012. Table B6 presents the CMAG titles for each of the advertisements used. Table B7
presents the cumulative percentiles of many of the common characteristics of advertisements
for the Michigan set of ads that was used in the MTurk Sample 1 and the CCES surveys.
Table B8 provides the same data for the Virginia set of ads that was used in the second
MTurk sample. In both cases, the characteristics of these ads are often the same as a majority
of the advertisements as compared to other ads aired in that election cycle. For example, in
Table B7, examining all House ads ran in 2008, 86.8% do not mention the political party
of the candidate sponsoring the advertisement. Similarly, of all the House ads in 2012,
80.6% do not mentioned the political party of the sponsoring candidate, the same as all six
advertisements used in the experiment.
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Table B6: Advertisements in the Experiments
Type Partisanship Creative Title
2008 Michigan House Ads
Positive Democrat ‘Turn Things Around’
Negative Democrat ‘Walberg Lies’
Contrast Democrat ‘These People’
Positive Republican ‘Pretty Bad Things’
Negative Republican ‘Children’s Future’
Contrast Republican ‘Key to Economy’
2012 Virginia House Ads
Positive Democrat ‘Accountable’
Negative Democrat ‘Rigell Doesn’t Share My Values’
Contrast Democrat ‘Personal Attacks’
Positive Republican ‘Defining Moment for Our Country’
Negative Republican ‘Hirschbiel Anything But Jobs’
Contrast Republican ‘Hirschbiel a Shame’
Table B7: Characteristics of 2008 Michigan House Advertisements
Con. (Rep.) Neg. (Rep.) Pos. (Rep.) Con. (Dem.) Neg. (Dem.) Pos. (Dem.)
Tone Contrast Negative Positive Contrast Negative Positive
20.5% 35.0% 44.5% 20.5% 35.0% 44.5%
Candidate Approval Beginning Beginning End End End End
15.3% 15.3% 70.8% 70.8% 70.8% 70.8%
Candidate Appears Yes No Yes Yes No No
31.9% 44.6% 31.9% 31.9% 44.6% 44.6%
Specifies Party No No No No No No
86.8% 86.8% 86.8% 86.8% 86.8% 86.8%
Cites Sources Yes, Other Yes No Yes Yes No
5.2% 6.7% 47.4% 11.7% 27.5% 47.4%
Subject Policy Policy Policy Policy Personal and Policy Policy
53.6% 53.6% 53.6% 53.6% 30.7% 53.6%
Mentions Economics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
73.1% 73.1% 73.1% 73.1% 73.1% 73.1%
Mentions Taxes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
42.8% 42.8% 42.8% 57.2% 42.8% 57.2%
Mentions Jobs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
27.0% 27.0% 27.0% 27.0% 27.0% 27.0%
Percentages represent cumulative percent of all House ads ran in 2008.
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Table B8: Characteristics of 2012 Virginia House Advertisements
Con. (Rep.) Neg. (Rep.) Pos. (Rep.) Con. (Dem.) Neg. (Dem.) Pos. (Dem.)
Tone Contrast Negative Positive Contrast Negative Positive
22.2% 43.2% 34.6% 22.2% 43.2% 34.6%
Candidate Approval Middle Beginning End End Beginning End
5.8% 21.7% 72.3% 72.3% 21.7% 72.3%
Candidate Appears Yes No Yes No No Yes
38.4% 61.6% 38.4% 61.6% 61.6% 38.4%
Specifies Party No No No No No No
80.6% 80.6% 80.6% 80.6% 80.6% 80.6%
Cites Sources Yes Yes No No Yes No
33.5% 33.5% 66.5% 66.5% 33.5% 66.5%
Subject Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy
63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9%
Mentions Economics (generic) No Yes Yes No Yes No
94.8% 5.2% 5.2% 94.8% 5.2% 94.8%
Mentions Medicare Yes No No Yes No No
29.0% 71.0% 71.0% 29.0% 71.0% 71.0%
Mentions Budget No Yes Yes No No Yes
81.0% 19.0% 19.0% 81.0% 81.0% 19.0%
Percentages represent cumulative percent of all House ads ran in 2012.
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I provide here other analyses that includes the pairwise t-tests to compare the
effectiveness of the contrast ad compared to the positive or negative ads aired by candidates.
Table B9 assesses the issue of backlash against the Democratic sponsor for airing a contrast
ad. In support of previous research that finds reduced backlash for contrast ads, across
all three samples, I find no evidence of backlash. Table B10 replicates this analysis if the
sponsor of the contrast ad was a Republican, and only one of the three samples finds evidence
of backlash. Table B11 examines if a contrast or negative ad is more effective, while Table
B12 presents the results comparing a contrast ad to a positive ad. I find inconsistent results
where half of the time the contrast ad is more effective than the negative ad, but in other
cases, the result disappears. Similarly, the results for whether a contrast ad is more effective
than a positive ad yields mixed results. Tables B13 through B16 replicate these results using
the thermometer ratings instead of the candidate’s vote share, with similar findings. Table
B17 provides the correlation between vote choice and both Republican and Democratic
candidate thermometer ratings.
Table B9: Democratic Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Positive (R) vs 54.4 59.4 50.0
Contrast (D) 0.53 0.19 0.55
Negative (R) vs 52.7 54.8 51.5
Contrast (D)
Table B10: Republican Candidate Thermometer by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Positive (D) vs 42.0 47.2 45.1
Contrast (R) 0.13 0.84 <0.01
Negative (D) vs 37.7 47.9 38.9
Contrast (R)
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Table B11: T-tests for Change in Support by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value
Contrast (R) vs 31.1% 51.3% 25.7%
Positive (D) 0.25 0.08 0.80
Negative (R) vs 37.1% 41.9% 24.6%
Positive (D)
Contrast (D) vs 31.5% 45.8% 38.2%
Positive (R) 0.05 0.07 0.86
Negative (D) vs 41.6% 55.5% 37.4%
Positive (R)
Table B12: T-tests for Change in Support by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value
Contrast (R) vs 30.8% 47.5% 29.4%
Negative (D) 0.04 0.16 0.09
Positive (R) vs 41.6% 55.5% 37.4%
Negative (D)
Contrast (D) vs 26.9% 43.8% 35.1%
Negative (R) 0.05 0.74 0.02
Positive (D) vs 37.1% 41.9% 24.6%
Negative (R)
Table B13: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Democratic Candidate Thermometer - Ad Target
Contrast (R) vs 56.9 53.8 59.7
Positive (D) 0.36 < 0.001 0.61
Negative (R) vs 59.3 64.3% 60.8
Positive (D)
Republican Candidate Thermometer - Ad Sponsor/Backlash
Contrast (R) vs 42.0 47.2 45.1
Positive (D) 0.80 0.04 < 0.001
Negative (R) vs 42.8 53.7 36.3
Positive (D)
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Table B14: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer - Ad Target
Contrast (D) vs 47.7 55.6 48.0
Positive (R) 0.12 0.91 0.02
Negative (D) vs 43.3 55.2 41.9
Positive (R)
Democrat Candidate Thermometer - Ad Sponsor/Backlash
Contrast (D) vs 54.4 59.4 50.0
Positive (R) < 0.01 < 0.01 0.53
Negative (D) vs 42.5 40.7 51.5
Positive (R)
Table B15: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Democratic Candidate Thermometer - Ad Target
Contrast (R) vs 46.1 41.2 53.3
Negative (D) 0.19 0.91 0.45
Positive (R) vs 42.5 40.7 51.5
Negative (D)
Republican Candidate Thermometer - Ad Sponsor/Backlash
Contrast (R) vs 37.7 47.9 38.9
Negative (D) 0.05 0.05 0.25
Positive (R) vs 43.3 55.2 41.9
Negative (D)
Table B16: Thermometer Ratings by Advertising Tone
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer - Ad Target
Contrast (D) vs 40.6 52.3 41.0
Negative (R) 0.49 0.67 0.05
Positive (D) vs 42.8 53.7 36.3
Negative (R)
Democrat Candidate Thermometer - Ad Sponsor/Backlash
Contrast (D) vs 52.7 54.8 51.5
Negative (R) 0.02 < 0.01 < 0.001
Positive (D) vs 59.3 64.3 60.8
Negative (R)
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Table B17: Correlations Between Vote Choice and Thermometer Ratings
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Value Correlation Value Correlation Value Correlation
Vote Choice 33.1% 47.8% 31.8%
0.64∗ 0.48∗ 0.51∗
Republican Thermometer 42.4 52.1 41.9
Vote Choice 33.1% 47.8% 31.8%
−0.43∗ −0.49∗ −0.47∗
Democratic Thermometer 52.0 53.1 54.5
Republican Thermometer 42.4 52.1 41.9
−0.25∗ −0.29∗ −0.24∗
Democratic Thermometer 52.0 53.1 54.5
∗p< 0.01 Correlation statistically significantly different from zero.
I present here the results separated by partisanship to test if Democrats responded
differently to Republicans. Democrats and Republicans are defined by the three point party
scale. Table B18 presents the N of each treatment group by partisanship. Table B19 presents
the overall vote choice by partisanship and treatment group, replicating Table B1. Tables
B20 and B21 replicate the main table in the paper by partisanship. The only statistically
significant relationship is for Republicans who responded more harshly to a negative ad
by a Democrat in two of the three samples. Tables B22-B25 test for both backlash and
intended effect for Democrats and Republicans. These results are in line with the original
results. Taken together, there is limited evidence that Democrats responded differently than
Republicans.
Table B18: Treatment Group Size by Partisanship
Treatment Group MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
Pos (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 64 30 52 47 87 31
Neg (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 75 21 54 37 82 39
Con (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 83 30 63 37 84 34
Pos (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 63 28 60 51 93 39
Con (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 72 25 62 42 92 38
Neg (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 77 23 48 30 82 34
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Table B19: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups and Partisanship
Treatment Group MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
Pos (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 14.8% 86.7% 10.7% 75.7% 5.7% 71.0%
Neg (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 24.0% 85.7% 11.5% 97.9% 14.6% 89.7%
Con (Dem) vs. Pos (Rep) 12.0% 86.7% 15.9% 94.6% 13.1% 85.3%
Pos (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 7.9% 67.9% 8.5% 90.2% 7.6% 63.2%
Con (Dem) vs. Neg (Rep) 5.6% 88.0% 11.3% 90.2% 8.7% 91.9%
Neg (Dem) vs. Con (Rep) 7.8% 95.7% 12.5% 90.0% 4.9% 91.2%
Table B20: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone, Democrats Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value
Positive (R) vs 12.0% 15.9% 13.1%
Contrast (D) 0.15 0.46 0.35
Negative (R) vs 5.6% 11.3% 8.7%
Contrast (D)
Positive (D) vs 7.9% 8.5% 7.6%
Contrast (R) 0.98 0.51 0.46
Negative (D) vs 7.8% 12.5% 4.9%
Contrast (R)
Table B21: T-tests for Change in Vote Choice by Advertising Tone, Republicans Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value Republican Vote p-value
Positive (R) vs 86.7% 94.6% 85.3%
Contrast (D) 0.88 0.47 0.39
Negative (R) vs 88.0% 90.2% 91.9%
Contrast (D)
Positive (D) vs 67.9% 90.2% 63.2%
Contrast (R) < 0.01 0.98 < 0.01
Negative (D) vs 95.7% 90.0% 91.2%
Contrast (R)
Table B22: Testing Backlash: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone, Democrats Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 38.6 49.0 41.8
Contrast (D) 0.24 0.21 0.05
Negative (R) vs 33.9 42.1 34.5
Contrast (D)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 67.1 67.5 64.7
Contrast (R) < 0.01 0.02 0.09
Negative (D) vs 54.3 54.3 59.7
Contrast (R)
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Table B23: Effect on Target: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone, Democrats Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 34.6 36.6 43.8
Contrast (R) 0.27 0.27 < 0.01
Negative (D) vs 30.3 42.9 33.3
Contrast (R)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 61.8 65.1 57.1
Contrast (D) 0.56 0.73 0.08
Negative (R) vs 59.5 63.4 63.1
Contrast (D)
Table B24: Testing Backlash: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone, Republicans Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 73.6 64.8 63.6
Contrast (D) 0.79 0.76 0.85
Negative (R) vs 72.1 66.3 64.4
Contrast (D)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 55.3 41.2 55.9
Contrast (R) < 0.01 0.37 0.24
Negative (D) vs 34.5 35.1 49.6
Contrast (R)
Table B25: Effect on Target: T-tests on Candidate Thermometer Rating by Advertising
Tone, Republicans Only
MTurk Sample 1 CCES Sample MTurk Sample 2
Treatment Rating p-value Rating p-value Rating p-value
Republican Candidate Thermometer
Positive (D) vs 59.5 59.5 58.6
Contrast (R) 0.28 0.99 0.46
Negative (D) vs 66.7 59.6 62.9
Contrast (R)
Democratic Candidate Thermometer
Positive (R) vs 37.4 53.0 47.2
Contrast (D) 0.64 0.44 0.08
Negative (R) vs 40.5 46.5 38.4
Contrast (D)
Appendix C
Chapter 4 Appendix: Interest Group
Advertising
Table C1 presents the raw Republican vote share for each of the six primary treatment
groups in the experiment. Table C2 is a balance table of covariates across all six treatment
groups. The groups are fairly well balanced across a wide range of attributes including
gender, age, race, and education. Table C3 presents the specific advertisements used in the
experiment, including their titles. Table C4 presents a table of characteristics of the six
advertisements used in the experiment. These represent typical advertisements as shown in
the cumulative percentage of ads from 2010 that also contained those characteristics. Finally,
Figure C.1 presents the percent of respondents who correctly identified whether the sponsor
of the advertisement was a candidate or non-candidate, in a binary question, including 95%
confidence intervals.
124
125
Table C1: Republican Vote Share by Treatment Groups
Treatment Group Sample
Candidate (Dem) vs. Interest Group (Rep) 35.2%
Interest Group (Dem) vs. Candidate (Rep) 38.8%
Party (Dem) vs. Candidate (Rep) 32.5%
Candidate (Dem) vs. Party (Rep) 36.0%
Party (Dem) vs. Interest Group (Rep) 28.7%
Interest Group (Dem) vs. Party (Rep) 31.7%
Table C2: Balance Table of Covariates
Treat. 1 Treat. 2 Treat. 3 Treat. 4 Treat. 5 Treat. 6
Democrat 45.5% 43.8% 39.1% 46.2% 42.4% 48.0%
Female 48.5% 48.3% 52.1% 48.2% 47.3% 54.0%
Age 34.3 34.7 34.7 32.5 34.7 33.3
Non-white 25.3% 22.7% 25.1% 21.3% 18.2% 24.5%
Married 55.6% 49.3% 54.4% 43.7% 54.2% 52.0%
College Diploma 57.1% 46.8% 50.2% 60.9% 57.6% 56.9%
Voted in 2012 72.2% 67.0% 74.4% 73.1% 74.9% 69.3%
Unemployed 4.5% 7.9% 4.7% 5.6% 4.9% 4.0%
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Figure C.1: Percent of Respondents Correctly Identifying the Sponsor: Binary Choice,
Six Types
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Table C3: Advertisements in the Experiments
Type Partisanship Creative Title
2010 Ohio House Ads
Candidate Democrat ‘Here’
Party Democrat ‘Multi Milliionaire’
Interest Group Democrat ‘Every Year’
Candidate Republican ‘What Ohio Needs’
Party Republican ‘Real Boss’
Interest Group Republican ‘Making It Worse’
Table C4: Characteristics of 2010 Ohio House Advertisements
Cand. (Rep.) Party (Rep.) Int. Group (Rep.) Cand. (Dem.) Party (Dem.) Int. Group (Dem.)
Tone Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
48.3% 48.3% 48.3% 48.3% 48.3% 48.3%
Cand. Approval Yes, end of spot N/A N/A Yes, end of spot N/A N/A
49.5% 29.9% 29.9% 49.5% 29.9% 29.9%
Favored No No No Yes No No
Cand. Appears 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 54.2% 45.8% 45.8%
Opposed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cand. Appears 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% 63.2%
Specifies Party No No No No Yes, Pro Party No
80.7% 80.7% 80.7% 80.7% 8.2% 80.7%
Cites Sources No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
34.1% 65.9% 65.9% 34.1% 65.9% 65.9%
Subject Policy Personal and Policy Personal and Policy Policy Personal and Policy Policy
58.5% 31.4% 31.4% 58.5% 31.4% 58.5%
Percentages represent cumulative percent of all House ads ran in 2010.
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